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PREFACE·
The purpose of this paper is to show that, as the
result ot twenty-two years of intermittent warfare between
England and the Netherlands, the English navy became es•
tablished as the primary naval power of Europe.

Also, I

intend to illustrate that, as a by-product of this naval
warfare, Dutch trade was seriously hurt, with the· major
benefactors of this Dutch loss of trade being the English.
This paper grew out of a seminar paper on the first
Anglo•Dutch war for a Tudor and Stuart English History
graduate seminar class taught in the fall of 1966 by Dr.
John R. Rilling of the University

or

Richmond.

Because

in the present paper I attempt to cover such a large topic,
all other aspects of English history of this period will
be covered only insofar as they affected the Dutch wars.
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Chapter I
The First Anglo-Dutch War
On the surface, war did not appear likely in 1652;
both England and The Netherlands were protestant in religion and republican in political organization.

Each

country had agents in the other's capital working for
closer mutual relations. 1 . Indeed, there was even a vague
dream of English republicans to unite the two nations and
form a mighty, protestant republic. 2

But this was only one side or the picture in 1652;
if one looks deeper he can see underlying differences
between the two nations.

or

In the first place, a majority

the Dutch were shocked at the execution ot Charles I

and the establishment of a republic in England.)

When

they recovered from their shock, the Dutch people gave

support to his son, the

Ir. 4

~

jure ruler of England, Charles

This anti-republican, pro-royalist feeling would nat-

urally cause resentment in England, but, in addition to
this, the English were jealous of Dutch wealth and trade
which, they felt, was conducted at the expense of Englando5
The Dutch fisheries, which were a major cornerstone of
Dutch world trade, collected their fish in English waters
north of Scotland.6

Also the Dutch bought unprocessed

English cloth at low prices, dyed it and sold it back to
the English at higher prices.7 As i£ adding insult to
injury, the Dutch were cutting into the English trade with
their own colonists.

Thus, there was a feeling among the

English that they were being exploited and that a good
proportion of the wealth flowing into the Netherlands
rightfully belonged to Englandog
An important phase of the balance-of-trade
argument, which came to be an obsession
with writers of the age, derives from the
resentments which English merchants and
politicians felt against what they deemed
to be England's subservience to the Dutch
economic system. Why was treasure draining away from England? Why was trade hampered and strangled by a physical scarcity
of coin? The answer was plain. So long
as the Dutch sucked England dry of her
stocks of ,raw materials, there could be
no development of England's manufacturing

4.Ibid.,.
. .
P• 48.
~Ibid., P• 5.

Ibid-.,
JJ.
7gibid., P•
PPo 8-9.
Ibid., p.{.9'o

.3

capacity; no opportunity for English merchants to benefit by the most profitable
stages of the economic process. So long
as English purchasers could be tempted in
an uncontrolled market by succulent Dutch
imports and so long as English importers
were undersold by the competition of Dutch
rivals in an open market, it was impossible
to correct the 9 disequil~brium in the balance of trade.
The reason that this fear of Dutch trade seems to have
suddenly appeared in the 1650's was that administrative
measures against the use of Dutch-owned ships, some English
acquisitions of ships built in Holland and Dutch involvement in war in the 1620's and '30's blunted the impact of
Dutch competition with England.

With the end of the Thirty

Years' War in 161.,8 and the virtual end of the English
Civil War at the execution of Charles I in 1649, fear of
the Dutch reappeared in an intensified form, shattering
all complacency among English merchants.

The initial

reaction was a belated but widespread ·recognition by English shipowners of the advantages of Dutch ships in hand-

iness

the carriage of bulk trade arid cheapness of
operation and handling. 10
fo~

By the use of abundant and cheap capital, lower wages,
timber floated down on navigable waters, more up-to-date
methods and machinery and the use of mass production methods,
'·3bi~., PP• 144-145.
·
1 Ra ph Davisi The Rise of the English Shipping Indust=rY in the 17th & 8th Centuries (LOndon, 1962}, p.;o.

tha Dutch could build a ship at a cost to them of four
pounds ten shillings a ton, while it would cost seven
pounds a ton to build that same ship in England. 11 In
1669 a ship could be built in Holland for eight hundred
pounds that would cost thirteen hundred pounds in England.
A larger ship, costing fourteen hundred pounds in Holland,
would cost twenty-four hundred pounds in England.·

"The

English merchant could not build cheaply because he could
not import timber and other materials cheaply, and he
could not import cheaply because he could not build

cheaply.n12
The Dutch enjoyed this advantage in ships and shipbuilding and with it the advantage of being the middleman
for the world's goods because they started

~irst.

The

Netherlands had become "the Phonecia of modern timesnl3
because she traded while other nations fought.

England

had a large trade with Portugal, Brazil, the Canaries
and Madeira in sugar, "speckled wood" (mahogany), fruit
and wine, with France in canvas. linen, brandy and wine,.

with the Baltic countries in naval stores and with the
Mediterranean in spices. silk, fruit and oil.

England

traded for these goods with fish, tin, lead and manu-

llnavid Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (Oxford, 1934), Vol. 1, P• 233.
·

·

l2violet Barbour, rmutch and English Merchant Shipping

in the Seventeenth Century", Economic History Review, Vol.

II, 1930, P• 267.
lJA. T... Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History
1660-1783 (Boston, 1890), PP• 95-97.

s
taetured goods, mainly cloth.

Some imports, such as to-

bacco from Virginia and Maryland and sugar from Barbados,
were re-exported.14
While, from our point ot view, the outlook for
growth and expansion

or

th~

English trade was good, to the

Englishman of the seventeenth century the tailure of the

old chartered companies to provide adequate outlets for
the export of English goods was another surface indication of Dutch superiority•

The Merchant Adventurers were

in debtJ the Levant Company was suffering from rivalry
with the French and the frauds

or

its factors; the Green-

land Adventurers were ceasing to pursue the whale; the
African Company was barely able to hold its own against
the Dutch on the west coast of Africa; the East India
Company'was having·its troubles with the Dutch in the
East Indies; and the herring in British waters was being
caught and marketed by the "Flemingsn 1 5 within sight of
helpless English spectators on the shore. 16
The Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 were enacted in

14ogg, I, PP• 222·22).
15nav1s, p. 47.
·
loogg, I, PP• 222-223.

6

order to gain 'control or the trade that rightfully belonged
to England. 17 There has long existed a view among historians that this was the direct cause of the war;lS however
the view now held is that the Navigation Acts were only a·
representation of the underlying causes 0£ the wars•

In

fact, the immediate effect of the Navigation Act of 1660
was to drive the English .from the Baltic trS:de, to the
advantage

or

the Dutch.

The reason for this was that

English importers had been using foreign buill!t ships tor
their.Baltic trade,·which they were prohibited from doing

legally.by.this act and, since

ships were unsuitable

Eng~ish

for carrr/ing the bulk cargoes of the Baltic trade cheaply,
the English were forced out.19
Another point on which the English and Dutch conflicted

· was the right

or

search.

The Dutch were in favor of estab-

lishing the principle that the flag covered the safety of
.

'

the goods, while the English felt they had the right to

search any neutral ships during wartime.~o
A more immediate cause of the war was the Dutch decision
in 1652 to add one hundred fifty warships to their existing

17samUel Rawson Gardiner 1 Histor! 0£ the Commonwealth
and Plgteotorate (New York, 1697), .Vo~. II, pp. I46-I2;8. ·
Samuel Rawson Gardiner and c. T. Atkinson {Editors),
Letters and
ers Relatin to the First Dutch War 16 2ndon .
- 3
•
Ogg,
p. 2Jft.
20w11aon, p. 58. An in.formal, undeclared, maritime war
with France had been in exisw~nce since 1649, because France
gave refuge and support to Charles II. Ibid.

Pa
I;

7
fleet of seventy•six.21

While done ostensibly to make

the English think twice before entering a war with the
Dutch, the effect was to cause a corresponding escalation
of war reeling in England. 22 In an effort to prevent war,

Dr. Dorislaus, a Dutclunan by birth, had baen sent over
by.. the English as an ainbassador in 1649, 23 but ha was

murdered by royalist assassins.

The English did not use

this as a pretext for war, however, but tried to ignore
this violent act by sending a new embassy.

While this

embassy did not meet with open violence, the official.
reception was cold and the reaction of the crowds, incited
by English Royali.st · emigr~sr was angry and anti-English.

From this. time on,.. war was· oo!lsidered only a matter of
time. 24
. While the Dutch did not want to provoke an incident,
they were reaching a point where they could no longer afford

as a matter of national P,ride to back down in another conflict concerning the right to search.

10~

Accordingly, on May

1652,,2.5 Lieutenant Admiral Tromp of the Dutch navy

received instructions from the States General of the lfother-

lands to prevent Dutch ships from being searched by n.roreign
shipsn.26 On May 15, Tromp eave instructions to his cap-

2lor the pr.ejected one hundred fifty ships, the Dutch

built eighty•eight.

Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 228.

22Ibid., I,. .pp. 51-52.
·
23t. Stephens and Si~ey Lee~ The Dictionarz
tiona~ Biograph1·(London, 1917), vol. V, P• 1147.
dijJ!!son, p. 48.

25To avoid confusion, all dates will be given

or

Na~

as this

one is; aacording to the New Style or Gregori.an calendar ..

2ooard1ner and Atkinson, I, pp. 155•159.

8
tains to.resist all attempts at boarding. 27 On the 19th•
Tromp left Dover Bay, where he had been permitted by Commodore Bourne to repair damages done by a recent storm,
and put out to sea intending to make for Calais.

On the

way, he received word (which later turned out to be

ex~

aggarated) that a Dutch fleet had been attacked by the
English.

He immediately decided to go to their aid and
thus encountered the English fleet. 2g
When the commander of the English fleet, Admiral

Blake, saw the Dutch £leet approaching, he fired three
warning shots at Tromp's flag to indicate to Tromp that
he should strike his £lag as was customary £or foreign
vessels encountering English ships in the channel.
stead

In-

or

doing this, Tromp fired a broadside at Blake·and
ran up a red flag, .signalling his fleet to fight. 29 Al~ppi.tgh. outnumbered by forty capital shipsJO to twenty-·

three, ·eight of which did not arrive until late.in the
battle~

Blake emerged the victor, capturing one ship of

thirty guns and probably sinking another.31

This inci-

dent was the immediate cause of the war, although the

Dutch ambassadors in London continued to work for a peace
~~Ibid!.; I, . pp. 165-166.

XSid.; I; PP• 196-199.
29 ii5id.',
PP• 192·196.
30As I aml,using
1t here, a capital ship io one carrying
in exgess ot thirty guns.
· JiJ. R. Powell (Ed.), The Letters of Robert Blake (London, 1937), PP• 158-159.
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which was no longer possible.3 2
As previously indi.oated, the Dutch were primarily a

commercial people whose entire economy depended on trade.

Only about ten per cent or the Dutch population was engaged in agriculture; whereas twenty per cent was engaged
in.the fishing industry and forty per cent made their living
from trade.33

The English at this time were primarily a

self-supporting, agricultural nation,34 whose only weakness
exposed to attack by an enemy navy was the coastal coal
trade from Newcastle to London.35

The Dutch were at a

geographical disadvantage first because of the proximity
of England and her position athwart the major Dutch trade

routesJ6 and, secondly, because during three-quarters of
the· year the prevailing winds in the area were westerly,
making it very difficult for even a superior navy to

greatly endanger the gnglish harbors on the ~forth Sea.37
The Dutch were also at this time experiencing internal
political 41ffioulties.

There was a conflict between the

Regents, the upper-middle class 0£ prosperous merchants
who favored peace at all costs and a Republic {controlled
~~Gardiner and' Atkinson, I, p. 228 •
...,,.,Wilson, p. 31h
5~Gardiner and Atkinson,. VI, p. 11.
Wilson,, P• 34.

36

3?~~;gin'e·rP·,·_ c5o.mmonwealth

122-123.

an d Pro t ec t ora t e, II , PP•

·10
by them,·0£ course), and the Orangists, the majority of

the population.

This latter faction was staunchly Cal-

vinistic (while .the Regents had been the last to accept
Calvinism) and favored the House
garchic rule of the Regents.

or

Orange over the oli·

The Orangists also did not

want war with Eneland, but favored instead renewed war•
fare with the Spanish papists; however, the Orangists
were the group most af£ected by the execution of Charles

r.3.a
In addition to this basic division, the Dutch gov-

ernmental structure was also disunited.

Each municipal-

ity ·of the Dutch Republic sent deputies to the seven

Provincial States which, .in turn, sent deputies to the.
States General; however, sovereignity rested ultimately
with the niunicipalit;ies.39

The control of the Dutch

navy was also divided among five different admiralty boards,
each exeroisillg separate control and depending· for co-.
ordinate· action on the States Genara1.40

A .further set-..

back to Dutch naval unity had been provided by the death
of the Prince of Orange, William II, in 16;o.41 When the
Regents gained control of the government following his
death. ·the oldest 1 most experienced of the Dutch capt_ains

ll

were forced out because of their allegiance to the House

of Orange.42
England• on the other hand, showed a unity and strength

ot purpose one usually associates with an efficient dictatorship.

Under Cromwell's rule, officials owing posts to

court influence, purchase or seniority were replaced to a
large extent by people who had given proof of their ability
by their conduct in parliament or, better still, on the

tield of battle in the recent civil war.

As

a result, the

administrative head ot the English navy, the Admiralty
Committee. strove to provide the navy with whatever it
demanded.

While it did not always fulfill this ideal,

the administrative record of this war was one of the best
in English naval history.43

In March

or 16S4,

shortly before the end

or

the war,

an English sea-captain named Foster captured a richly laden

Dutch ship off the Dogger Bank.

Since he spoke Dutch and

the Dutch skipper spoke English, Foster asked him why the

Dutch had entered the war when England virtually had them
surrounded..

His answer was that the Dutch had a large,

experienced navy, fresh from victory over Spain, whereas
the English had a small navy.44 For this reason, the Dutch

t~Oppenheim, p. J06.
Jibid.' pp. 305-306.,
'
4'.;0n October 21, 16)9, Tromp completely defeated a
Spanish fleet led by Oquendo in the Downs. G. J.·Marcus,·
A.Naval .Histprt of Englanq,(Boston, 1961), Vol. I, P• 134•
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hoped to hurt the English with one
them into port to mend.

or

two battles, forcing

While this was going on• the
.

.

Dutch would be blockading English ports and disrupting
the coal trade, thus forcing the English to agree to peace
on Dutch terms.

In addition, the Dutch had an ace up

their· sleeves in the rormof Charles II who would be
readily available in the event of a revolt in England.
The Dutch commander blamed the Dutch defeat on the fact
that the Prince

or·

Orange died in 1650 and the States ·

General turned out all his friends in the Dutch navy and
replaced them with gentlemen creatures.

He pointed out

that the English parliament• on the other hand, turned

out all the Kingts captains who were gentlemen and
placed them with seamen.

re~

He believed that 1r-this had

been the other way· around, the Dutch would have won.4;
While the eventual English victory in this war·may
in some part be explained by the political strength

or

England as opposed to the disunity in the Netherlands,
more ot the credit belongs to the strength and conduct

ot the English navy. After its Elizabethan greatness,
the navy had fallen into a period ot decay.

England's

merchant shipping expanded and the navy declined in size
and· importance.

One result of this was an increase ot ·

piracy which1 by 1640, had grown so bad that it was

45Gardiner and Atkinson. l, PP• 31-33.
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thought necessary to extinguish the light in the Lizard
lighthouse because of its assistance to
result

or

the decline

or

pirates~

Another

English naval supremacy in its

own waters was that in late October of 1639, England was
unable to prevent a naval battle between the Dutch and

Spanish in the Downs, England's front yard.

In the latter

days of James I and Charles I, the pendulum began to swing

slowly the other way.

Despite some setbacks, there was a

continued slow improvement until Parliament obtained con•
trol over the navy during the civil war.

From this time

on the navy's strength greatly increased.46
When the English civil.war spread to the sea with the
·detection of several capital ships because regular army

officers were being placed'in command, the·navy.of Parliament
was given a chance to learn the art of naval warfare against
a relatively weak opponent. ·Although the Royalist ships

were eventually led by Prince Rupert

Whd had as many as four

capital ships as well as lesser vessels, the navy performed

its

~ask

well.

Blake; Deane and Popham were made ngenerals

at sea" and led the" navy in pursuit ot Rupert.47 Because
of ·this vigorous pursuit trom. Holland to Portugal to the
Mediterranean Sea to the West Indies; Rupert's .fleet melted
away and in 165.3, Prince Rupert had only o.ne ship left,

4~tarcua, I; PP• 123-124.
:
" 47.Anderson, 1tOperatioris of the English Fleet", Engli,s~
Historical Review, 1916, PP• 406-411.
,
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with which he retired to France.48
VJhile the Dutch navy had more ships than the English,
the English ships, on the average, were bigger with more

and heavier guns and more men.49 On September 5, 1653,· it
was reported that there were one hundred forty Dutch warshipa50 but, as a list
were not capital ships.

or

June, 1652 shows,. the majority
In that list, there was only one

ship in .excess of fifty guns, one with more than forty
guns and there were forty ships carrying in excess
thirty guns •.51

or

In a list of English ships of September,

1653, there 'Were one hundred twenty-eight warships ot
which eighty-seven were capital ships.

Of these capital

ships, there was one carrying one hundred guns, one with
eighty-eight guns, there were three with more than sixty,
thirteen carrying in excess

or

fifty guns, twenty-five

with over £orty and forty-tour mounting more than thirty
guns.52 As a rule, the weight of capital ships ranged
anywhere from five hundred fifty to one thousand tons
with

~he

heavier the tonnage,. the more guns that ship

could carry.53 Until the las~ months of the.war, no
Dutch vessel exceded eight hundred tons and fifty-six
guns and there was only one 0£ this type, the

~l!arcus, I, pp. 135-136.
Wilson, p.·04.
~ 0Gard1ner and Atkinson, VI, p. 31.

1Ibid:,.

pp. 260-266.

·

·

~~Gardiner and Atkinson, Vi, pp.
~~oppenheim,·pp.

330-JJ4.

49-53.

"Brederode"~,

15
Trompts flagship~54
The major ship.used by the Duteh'merchants was the

fluitsohip or flyboat.

In its design' speed and

maneu~

verability were sacrificed for carrying capacity and
cheapness·of handling.

As a

res~lt•

usually slow and usually unarmed.·

the boats were

Their.only protection

was to travel in a convoy escorted by large numbers

or

warships.SS.

Because the· English were not·as·heavily engaged in·
overseas trade as the Dutch, their merchant ships were
not designed primarily £or cargo carrying.

Ot sixty-

three merchant ships in the Thames in 1653, twenty-six
displaced .from two hundred to three hundred tons, Twentyi'ivo were of three hund:red to four·hundred tons, seven
were between four hundred and four hundred £i£t7, four
were of five hundred tons and one was six hundred tons.
Because of their design, English merchant ships could
easily be changed into warships or privateers;· however,
in July of 1652, letters or marque were to be given only.
to owners able to send out ships in excess ot two hundred
tons and carrying more than twenty guns.S6

·Accompanying these major dif£erenoes -were several· of
lesser importance.. The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed
~~Beadon, P• lJJ... .
Wilson, pp. 4-5. · ·
56oppenheim, pp. 34J-J44.
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because they had to sail the shallow and sandy coasts of
their· home waters •. While this eave them a slight advantage
in·· avoiding the English if they ha.d to by ducking into

shallow water, they were less weatherly than English ships
which were £aster when sailing on a wind and better adapted
for tacking and maneuvering.

Thus, the Enc:lish were more

success£ul in gaining the weather gauge.57 This difference
in construction may have been the reason the hulls of Dutch
ships were weak and unable to stand severe punishment.SS

Another difference between the two navies was one 0£ tactics.
The Dutch ·gunners, for the most part., fired at the

r~nglish

masts, rigging and sails in an attempt to render the gnglish ships helpless so that they could be captured, while
the English gunners fired primarily at the Dutch hulls with
the intention of sinking the ship and/or killing the men of
the crew.S9

In 1637. an English man-0£-war being built at Woolwitch
in Kent was described by a man named Heywood.

The ship ex-

ceeded one thousand tons with gunports for more than eighty
guns.

The length

feet and the ship

or

the keel was one hundred twenty-eight

me~sured

forty-eight feet wide and seventy-

six feet .from the bottom of the keel to the main deok. · The

57Marcus. ·I, p. 138.

·

5Baardiner and·Atkinson, IV, p. 3.
·
59navid Hannay, Admiral Blake (New York 1: 1886), P• 96.
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utmost length 0£ the ship from the tip of the beakhea.d60
to-the aft end of the stern was two hundred thirty-two

feet.

On the beakhead sat King Edgar trampling seven kings

along with Cupid straddling and bridling a lion and six:

other statues

r~preaenting.counsel,

virtue and victory.

care, industry, strength,

Emblems and symbols, pertaining to both

land and sea, decoratttlthe rest of the ship. '-Finally, the

whole magnificent structure was painted· gold and black• a handsome color for this seventeenth century idea ot a·warship. 61
While descriptions of the diff erenaes of the: warships
may give an idea of the causes for English victory, the
ships alone did not fight the battles ()f the first AngloDutch war; a portion of this paper must be· set aside to·.

describe both the men who sailed and the men who commanded the

men~ot-war~

Although the Dutch had four times

as many seamen to draw on as a reserve supply for·their

warships, they were less well paid and fed worse than their
English counterparts·.

One reason for this was that each

Dutoh captain was contra-eted to provision his own ship.62

6oThe bea.khead was· the ornamented prow which served

as a lavatory for the- crew. John Smith, The Seaman's .
Grammm= and Dictionar! (London, 1691}, p. 10.
.

T. Heywood 1 A rue Descri tion of His 'Ma esties
Ro al Shi Built J.6 at oo witc
n ent
on on,
37),
PP• 2 .. •
pon exam nat on one gets t e distinct impression that this book was government sponsored propaganda to encourage people to pay their ship-money and to
show them how well it was being spent. For this reason,
the figures with regard to the size of the ship may have
been eomewhat exaggerated.
t>2Qppenheim, P'• .306.

Another reason was that the Dutch government gave the men
only half payf assuming that the men would be eager to
serve again in order to receive the rest or their pay.63
The highest paid member of the shipt's crew was the captain,

who received as much as one hundred thirty guilders a
month.64 The next ranking officer received around thirtysix guilders a month.

Skilled sailors, such as cooks•

surgeons, carpenters and

gunners~

received between

f0£l~

teen and thirty guilders a montht while the ordinary
seaman· got around six to eleven guilders per month. 65
While the English sailor's pay scale was about the
same,,· he almost always received full pay, although not
as promptly as he would have liked.

Skilled sailors re ..

ceived twenty-tour, shillings a month and ordinary seamen
were pa.id nineteen a nionth.66 ·In addition to his pay~
an English sailor received a share of the prise value of
a captured Dtttcb.sh1p.

At the beginning.of .the war, one-

third of the value ot the prize was divided among the crew,

except in the ·case of· a captured man•of•war, when they

were given one-halt the prize and the other halt went to
the tund ror the sick and wounded sailors and the widows
and orphans of sailors.

While the needs of- the-Treasury

later caused the government to greatly reduce this gener-

63oardiner.and Atkinson, .III, pp. lO·ll.

64A Dutch guilder was worth two English shillings.
Ibid •.1: III, . P• 104.
·
0 5Ibid.
· .
66oppenheim, p. .314.
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osity,. every sailor still received a share of the prize

and the sick and wounded and the widows and orphans were
still provided £or.67
The Dutch sailors' diet consisted mostly of cheese, .
hard bread and fish, supplemented by meat two days a week
and butter, salt, vinegar and a little more beer in summer

than·in winter.68 While the English officers ate better
than their men, ham in the winter and smoked; meat in the
summer along with butter, sugar, .white biscuits, oil and
.

.

mustard-seedf!.common and green cheese, all washed down.
with French wine, Spanish wine. brandy and good beer; the
average English seaman had a decidedly better menu than
the Dutch sailor.

There was plenty or bread and meat,

mostly beef and pork, supplemented by cheese. butter a.nd
.fish. . This i'are was accompanied by beer that was very
often bad and had to be replaced by water._ When this

happened, however,· the men were to be paid two pence a
day for each day.they had to drink· water instead of beer.

Although there was.some corruption here and there and
sometimes insufficient funds.were provided the Victuallers,
the English sailors were comparatively well-ted.69
Besides being well-paid and well-fed, the English ·

sailor was wall-clothed. Although he usually was expected
67Ibid.,. p. 309 •
68 G.ardiner and Atkinson,· I, p. 92 ...
6. 9oppenheim, PP• 325-320. ·
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to pay for his own clothes. he was provided with a two·
pound sum to replace clothes lost in action or shipwreck.
The clothes the ordinary seaman wore were a canvas jacket

and canvas drawers, a cotton waistcoat and cotton drawers,
shirts,· shoes and linen and cotton stockings. 70

Considering·the medical conditions of the seventeenth
century, the sick and.wounded were well·taken care ot.

A

man injured in·action continued to draw his pay until his
recovery or death.

In addition-to the hospital space pro-

vided by the,leading ports and London andthe work

or

such

eminent physicians as Dr. Daniel Whistler,71. each English
ship was to be provided with five pounds worth of medical
supplies ·(al.though

rath~r

crude at this time - rice, oat-

meal and sugar) per one hundred men every sixmonths.7~
·The major reason.that the discipline 0£ the English

crews was superior to the Dutch73 was that they bad a
strong, well•enforced legal code.· On December 2.5th• 1652,
Commons passed thirty-nine Articles

or

War for the main•·

tenanoe ot discipline. Thirteen o££enses were listed which
carried an unconditional death penalty while twelve offenses
to be punished.by
by a court

dea~h

or lesser.punishment, to be decided

ot war (court-martial). The trial conditions ·

were relatively fair. ·.The charges were to be heard before
70tbid., P•. 329.. .

·
and Atkinson, IV, p. 200.
~ oppenheim, p. 321.
3 Gardiner and Atkinson,· I, p. 218.
7~Garainer
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the. captain and seven officers of the ship in \ihich the

crime was committed •. · Then the· accused was only to.be: tried
in the· presence of flag ·officers and no ·finding.involving
loss :of life· or limb ·was to be carried

without· the ·

'OUt

Thus a prisoner

approval of the senior officer in command.

had a fairly good:·chance of getting an impartial triai.71+ ·
· As in· any .war, the officers received most ·or the.

attention; therefore, some mention o:C them should·be made
here•·

The English admirals had received little previous ·

experience on the water;·however, the majority of them .had
held oommands;:in the ·army during the civil war.

The most

famous of the English "generals at sea" ·were Blake, Deane,
Ayscu:e, Penn and

Monck,·75

From the start, Blake assumed

the leadership or the navy and, while' he was rio·Cromwell
or.Nelson, he was bold and inspiring with the ability to
do the best with what he had.· Monck, ·who assumed

co~

ieadership of the fleet.when Blake 'Was wounded,, was essentially a land-commander who·proved himself a very ca•
pable sea-commander in the latter part of this war (and
even more so in.the second·war).

The Dutch naval leaders,

Tromp.: Dewith, De Ruyter; Evertson and Floritz, ·had spent

more.time on the sea than their English opposites; in fact,
Tromp had served as a cabin-boy on his father•s ship~76,
· ?~ppenheim, pp. 311·312.
·· ·
· ·
oardiner; Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p. 136.

76Dixon, p. 217.

'

'

'
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While Dewith was brave to the point of rashness, he lost
his salt control when confronted by lack of disoipline.77
Tromp, on the other hand, was an able strategist, a skill-

ful tactician and considered the best seaman on either
side.78
Mention has been made 0£ the contribution ot the English administrative machinery towards the English victory,
but there has been no attempt to define and describe this
organization.

Naval administration was largely in. the

hands of the Admiralty Committee of the Council of State
and the Commissioners of the Navy.

While there was another

committee, the Committee of the Merchants ot the Navy and
Customs, this body took no real part in naval administration and was dissolved in 1654.

The Admiralty Committee . ·

met daily during the war·and, theoretically, had control
over the Commissioners or the Navy, but, because the
Commissioners were comprised of more experienced personnel, it was practically allowed.to control administrative affairs.
The duties of the Admiralty Committee and the Commissioners of the Navy were to supervise the building,
. repairing and titting out of ships, the purchase and di·s-·

tribution of stores, the control of the dockyards and the
?~Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p.

7 Marcus, p. 146.

136.
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maintenance of discipline.79

The degree to which these

duties were carried out can be seen with respect to the
building

or

new ships by comparing warship production

during the reign

or

Charles I and during the Commonwealth.•

During Charlest reign, if one or two ships were constructed in one year, this event was greeted with great rejoicing•

During .the Commonwealth, man-of-war were turned

out at the rate ot ten a year on the average with the peak
production or twenty-two warships in-1654.
not have

been

All this would

possible, however, without the greater rev-

enues provided by Parliament. Where Charles I had

~een

able to raise only one million pounds a year, Parliament

raised an average

or

two million pounds a· year with a

maximum annual expenditure approaching three million· pounds
in 16;2-16;3.SO

Along with the problem of building ships, the Admiralty
had to see that they were armed and fitted out.

Practically

. the only home source of new cannons was George Bourne, who
had been the Royal Gun.founder.

Since the output of his works

was inadequate to meet the demands brought on by war, guns

were obtained by disarming inland forts, taking guns .f'rom
captured merchant ships and

men-of-wa~,

importing cannons

from abroad and expanding the home gun-.founding industry.8l
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Before the war, both nations imported naval stores (masts,
hemp, pitch, tar, etc.) from the Baltic states; however,·
the Dutch were able very early in the war to persuade the
King of Denmark to close the straits to English shipping,.

forcing the English to look elsewhere for naval stores.82
This need was filled by obtaining masts, hemp, pitch and
tar from New England, SootlandS.3 and captured· Dutch ships.84
The English ships were then fitted out at the major ports,
Harwich, Plymouth, ·Chatham,

Wool~witoh.,

Deptford and Ports-.

mouth.85
As it has been indicated, the Dutch objective, indeed
their only hope, was to seek an engagement with the entire
English fleet and.knock it out in one battle.86

The English

objective was to attack and cripple Dutch commerce; it was
not at this time considered the primary duty of an English
·navy to destroy the enemy's fleet in preparation for a land

invasion.87

In fact, this was unnecessary since the Dutch

relied on their mercnant fleet for their existance.88 ,
After the first conflict on May 19, 1652, both navies
put into their home ports to refit, but the English, because they I:tad

suffe~ed

less, were ready to sail sooner·

~~Gardiner and Atkinson, III, P• ,369.
g Ibid.~ V, P• 216.
'+Ibid., III, PP• 1-2.

8~0ppenheim, p. ·36).

8

Wilson, P• 06.
7Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 299.
88aardiner• Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, PP•
121-1220
d
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than the Dutch.

On Juno 20, Blake was given instructions

to sail to the North Sea and seize the homeward bound Dutch
East Indies fleet, to scatter and destroy the Dutch fishing

fleet and, if the .first two objectives were ·carried out
successfully, to disrupt the Dutch Baltic trade. 89 He.· set
sail after the 24th of June90 and, by July ll, was within
sight of the Dutch fishing fleet. , Before proceeding further, he issued orders to Penn and his other officers to
attack only the Dutch men-of-war guarding the fishing
boats.91

Meanwhile the Dutch fleet under Tromp had set

out in pursuit, but, because of the unco-operative wind,
Tromp decided on the 14th of July to attack Ayscue's
smaller fleet anchored in the·Downs.
the Downs, but was hampered

fir~st

He tried to enter.

by calms and then by.

gales and on the 22nd, the wind shifted causing him to
change his mind again and pursue hS.s primary objective,

Blake.
In spite of its capriciousness, the weather was not
Tromp's only problem; he was running short of supplies.
He had a fleet of

ov~r

ninety ships, the crews

consumed food at the rate

of

or

or

which

over sixty thousand pounds

hard bread, three hundred fifty to four -hundred twenty

barrels of beer and three hundred fifty to four hundred

~gaardiner and Atkinson, I, p. )Ol.
Ibid., I, P• 313.
.
91Powell, . p. 168.

twenty barrels of .water a week.

This problem was further

increased by the fact that a supply fleet would have a
difficult time finding him without an appointed meeting
place and time.

Because he was pursuing the English fleet

and did not know where he would be at a given time, he

could not establish an appointed rondezvous.92
Ayscue, with only twenty ships,93 was indeed fortunate
that the wind changed.

In his report, he attributed this

good fortune to the will 0£ God: "They thought to have
performed wonders upon our fleet here in the absence

or

General Blake, but the Lord was pleased to disappoint them
and to bring to nought their counsela.n94

Meanwhile Blake's ·

fleet met the Dutch fishing guard on July 12 and captured
twelve Dutch men-of-war or between twenty and thirty guns
each; however, three had been so badly damaged in the battle
that they had to be sunk.95
In spite of the fact that his ships were running very
low on provisions and scurvey had broken out, Tromp continued the pursuit and,.by August 4,.he was within sight

of Blake's fleet.

Tromp was on the verge of attacking

when a severe.storm broke up his fleet and forced the Dutch
ships to head for home.96

Considering his lack of pro-

~~Gardiner·and Atkinson, I, pp. 3.38-368.

Ibid.; I, P• 369.
941bid
I, P• 374.
~~Ibid., I, PP• 383-385.
Ibid., I, ·R• 391~
1

.,
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visions, the outbreak

or

scurvey and the ease with which

the English fleet defeated the Dutch gl1ard, this wind mny
have been a blessing in

di~ise

for Tromp.

While Tromp was pursuing Blake in the North Sea, theAdmiralty Board of Amsterdam sent \iord to the States Gen-

eral on July 25 that the silver fleet at Cadiz needed an
escort home.

The value of the silver aboard this fleet

was put at between.fifteen and sixteen million guilders
(this fj.gure can

be

better appreciated when it is known

that it cost the Dutch one million four hundred thousand
guilders to maintain a fleet of thirty-five sail in the
Mediterranean Sea £or one year}.

On the 27th, word was

sent to the silver fleet that it should set sail because
there would be a fleet in the channel waiting to escort
it home.

On the 29th De Ruyter was put in command of this

fleet and plans were· made to rendezvous with the silver
fleet.

By August 3, the Dutch plans were for De Ruyter

to escort an outward bound convoy through· the channel and
then, leaving two men-of-war to continue with the convoy.
to cruise in the.channel and watch for the fleet from Spain.
If by any chance he should meet the silver fleet before the
meroha.nt fleet was entirely out of' the channel, De Ruyter's
orders were to immediately abandon the outgoing fleet, with
the exception of the two men-of-war, and bring in the sil-

ver fleet.97

97Ib1d., II, pp.

l~-45.
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By August 14, Ayscue's fleet in the Downs had in.
creased· to over £orty sail, whereas De Ruyter'a fleet cons~sted

or only a little over twenty ships until the 21st.

when sixty ships were added to his fleet.

Despite the

·arrival of. these ships, ·De Ruyter' s fleet was not as

strong

as

it would. 'appear, for, aa De Ruyter reported,

the majority

or

these ships were of poor. quality and ill·

equipped with insufficient crews and provisions for only
two months.

Nevertheless, he was able.to get between

fifty-five and sixty or them in shape and on the 26th of
Augus·t he was escorting a merchant fleet of twenty-five.

ships when he was attacked by Ayscue.

Of De Ruyter's

fleet, twenty-five were capital ships, while only twelve

of the forty or more English ships were of that size.
The Dutch claimed that the English lost three of their ·

best ships in the fighting and that only the wind, which
allowed the English to escape because of its timely shift
in ·direction, prevented their complete destru~ction.

the other side, the Englj.sh claimed the.Dutch lost

On
~hrea

of their beat ships and three others were so badly battered
as to be near sinking._98

It appears that the battle was

little more than a draw with the ·nutch the victors, since
it was the English who broke off the action and declined

to tight the next day.99

It also appears that, since the

§~Ibid.; I I; PP• 68-159.
Ibid., 11 , PP• 105-106.
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Dutch were not in the habit of escorting such a small merchant fleet with such a large number

or

warships, the Eng-

lish had fallen for a trap.
· After his failure to prevent the English from destrroy•
1ng the Dutch fishing fleet, Tromp was replaced in command
of the Dutch navy by Dewith.100 By the 30th of September,
Dewith had convoyed the merchantmen out of the channel and
made contact with the silver fleet, bringing it into port
on the 4th

or

Ootober.lOl

On October 8, Dewith's fleet of

about sixty sail was cruising alone in the channel when it
was spotted by an English fleet of more than sixty sail.
_This battle, known as the Battle of the Kentish Knock, was
decidedly an English victory.

Blake's fleet reported sink-

. ing three Dutch capital ships in excess 0£ forty guns and
capturing three other capital ships.

The English loss was

put at one man-of•war and two merchant ships damaged badly
enough that they had to put into port in danger of sinking.102
The English considered this such a

deo~sive

victory that

they decided to send thirty ships to relieve their hardpress ed Mediterranean fleet. 103 The English had £irst appeared in strength in the Mediterranean Sea in 1650 when
Blake was in pursuit

or

or

Rupert.

Since that -time a new turn

English naval policy had taken place.

The previously

unprotected Levant trade was now organized into a regular

ig~Ibid., II,

!S!a., II•

P• 223.

pp. 252-260.
102fS1a., II, pp. 268-291.
l03fbid., III, P• 61.

L -
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convoy system because the task of trade protection was now
regarded as one of the first duties of the English ,.navy • 104

The Mediterranean phase of the first Anglo-Dutch war
was almost- a forgotten story, but it deserves some mention.
here, not only because· it was part or the larger action,
but because this was practically the only time and place
in English naval history that the English were completely·
driven off the seaa.105

One reason tor the English defeat

in the Mediterranean was that when the war broke out the
Dutch fleet was united at Toulon, while part of the English

fleet was at Leghorn and part was at

Smyrna~

Another reason

was that the English commander at Leghorn, Appleton, was
unenterprising and incompetent, whereas the Dutch were commanded by the very capable Van Galen.

Even so, the English,

under the command of the captain of the Smyrna fleet, Badiley,
might have been able to make up for Appleton's blunders, had
it not been £or the fact that the Dutch·gave their Mediter-

ranean fleet full support, whereas the English gave no thought
to their fleet in the Mediterranean until flushed with success
after the Battle of the Kentish Knock.
port, the Dutch, who

o~ly

Because o.f' this sup-

outnumbered the English by fi£teen

to twelve at the start of the war, grew to over thirty-three
sail, while the English grew to a divided force of twenty
104~tarcus, I, P• 136•

105Jul1an

s.

Corbett, England in the Mediterranean (New

York, 1904), Vol. I, p. 207.
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sail.
The reason the English continued to remain divided
was that Appleton did not take advantage

or

the chance to

leave Leghorn at the start of the war, allowing Van Galen
plenty of time to blockade him.

Another cause of the even-

tual defeat was the necessity of having to rely on neutral
ports.

The Duke of Tuscany felt the English had overstayed

their welcome and told Appleton to leave.

While Appleton

might have been able to join Badiley, who was waiting just

ofr Leghorn, he hesitated too long and was crushed by Van
Galen.

Because

or

the loss of this naval battle in late

February of 1653 and because of the overwhelming Dutch
superiority in the Mediterranean, Badiley was forced to
head for home.

About the only compensation the English

had was that Van Galen died
battle. 106

or

wounds received in the

After Dewith's defeat at the Kentish Knock, he was
relieved of' oommand·o£ the navy and replaced by Tromp.107

Tromp's general orders were given in
States General

or

a

resolution

October 19t 1652:

It is understood that it is the first and
principle object of the State to do all
possible harm to the English fleet -to be
sent out, and for that end a sufficient
body of ships is to be kept together,

or

the
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in order that they may put to ·sea abou~
Nov. l, to the damage and offence or the
English tleer and also to give convoy
to the west. 68
·
· ··

In this proclamation can. be seen one

or

the major oausef!

of the Dutch defeat in the first war. . It is not enough
that Tromp was supposed to engage and destroy the English
fleet; he constantly had to provide convoy escorts to the
large Dutch merchant fleet.
While on escort duty, Tromp, with a fleet or over
ninety men-of-war escorting three hundred merchantmen,
met Blake's fleet of just over forty ships on December

12.

In the battle that followed, twenty English vessels,

whom Blake later termed "merchant freebooters",_ did not
engage

~nd

Purit~nt

the English were badly beaten.

Blake wrote to the

Ad.mir~lty

sume your Honours long for an account

Like a true

Committee: "I pre-

or

what hath passed

between us and the Dutch £leet, and I hope you have hearts
prepared to receive evil as well as good from the hand ot
God.n109

Once again, the English gained the wind and were

abl~ to retreat,110 but this battle, known as the Battle

ot Dungeness, was such a complete Dutch victory that Tromp
was thinking of. sailing up the Thames after Blake.

Luckily

for the English, Tromp did not have the pilots to negotiate

t8~aa~d.iner and Atk1nson 1 III, p. 23.
Ibid., IIIt pp .. 91-lOts.
110!bid., III, p. 252.
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the shallow waters and gave up the idea.lll The degree
to which the Dutch controlled the sea at this time can be
illustrated by the fact that lighthouses were issued in-

structions in late December of 1652 and early January of .

1653

t~lling

them how and when to light so that the Dutch

would not be able to use their light.112
While this was the high water mark of the Dutch navy
in this first war, Blake was working hard to repair his
fleet and make it ready to sail in February.

The fleet

sent to help Badiley in the Mediterranean was recalled

and by February, Blake had seventy-three State's Ships and
thirty merchant ships ready to sai1.llJ
left the Thames in search of Tromp.

On the 20th, he

At this time, Tromp,

with a fleet of seventy ships had escorted an outward bound
convoy and was in the process of bringing in a convoy

or

three hundred merchantmen when he was met by Blake's entire
fleet.

The Dutch merchant fleet was in the van and had

slipped past the English.£leet,.thus, the three day Battle

ot Portland, beginning on February 28, was fought between
the English fleet and the Dutch rearguard.
was a tremendous English victory.
were sunk or burned

~nd

Even so, it

Eleven Dutch warships

six capital ships 0£ around forty

guns each were captured along with around fifty merchantmen.

if~Ibid.;-III, PP• 154-156.
tbid., III, P• 30J.
113 Ibid.,
III, p. 335.
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The Dutch considered the damage to their fleet to be so
serious that they called home fourteen ships of their
Mediterranean fleet.114

The Battle of Portland cleared

the English Channel of Dutch shipping. forcing the merchantmen to use the northern route around Scotland.

For

this reason, Por_tland can be considered the Turning Point

of the war tor the English.

In addition to being forced to put into port to make
repairs and refit, the English fleet suffered· a blow in

the form

or

Blake's injury.115

He had been wounded above

the left knee which was not serious, but he caught a bad
cold after going ashore.116 ·He took a turn for the worse
and, for a while, it was felt that he would never be able
to go to sea again~ 11 7.

Along with Blake, the English had a large number
sick and wounded and were greatly in need of men.
wrote to the

A~miralty

or

As Penn

Committee on April 13: "A great part

0£ the fleet is but a short time victualled, severalthave

foul bottoms and other defects which will call tor sudden
repair; our want 0£ men is much and universal, especially
in the bigger ships, who in time of service will most re-

quir~ them.nalS

The· English were in such a need of men

~:i;Ibid.; IV, .PP• 30-229.

116Ibfd •• ; IV, pp. 78..$4.
11?!b~CI •• ; IV,, P• 229.

llgibid., IV, P• 32;.
?Era., IV, P• 29a.
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that they were not only getting soldiers to serve on ship.board, but there was such a large number of soldiers that

it was feared

ther~

would not be enough sailors to show the

soldiers what to do.119
While tha Dutch had been

~urt

more than the English in

the .last battle, both fleets were ready to sail aga:i.n at

about the same time.120
brand new eighty-e:tght

Led by Monck and Doane in the

eun

"Resolution", the English put

to sea and on_ June 12, 1653 they eneaged the Dutch fleet
off the Gabbard.

Tha two fleets met about eleven in the

morning and fought until nightfall when they drifted apart.
The next day, the battle was renewed again at about eleven
o'clock.

This day's battle lasted until after sunset when

the Dutch sought refuge in shallow water and the English
fleet broke off the action and rercrmed.

This English .

victory was even greater than the last because, while only
about twenty Dutch ships were sunk, destroyed or taken,
the English fleet was so little hurt that it was able to
keep the se~ and blockade the Dutch coast. 121 The only
major English loss in the Battle

or

the Gabbard122 was

Deane who was killed in the heat of battle, cut in two
by a cannon shot.123

i~6Ibfd·~ IV, P• 253.
Ibid., V, P• l.
121!6id.j
V~ PP• 16-85.
122
~Ibid.,_V,

P• 119.

12-'He.nnay, p. 112.
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The English were now the undis.put.ed masters of the

sea,. able to harass Dutch merchantmen· and,fishing boats
at will.

Also, the blockade of the Dutch coast, carried

out by a fleet of one hundrad tan sai1,l24 had a disaster.
125
ous effect on the Dutch economy.
The price of: corn,
which had been at thirteen shillings a bushel in 1652,

rose f'our pounds attar the defeat off the Gabbard and was
expected to rise even higher if the blockade were not
lifted.126 Trading was dead, money was scarce and people
were eating old pickled herring127 and longing .fot.. the

old days of wealth and plenty. 12g Also at this time,
there was a strong desire £or peace in the Netherlands,

especially in Holland.129
Much of the suffering 0£ the Dutch people was due
to the alarming rate at which English warships captured
Dutch merchantmen.

At the very start of the war, many

homecoming Dutch merchantmen were eaai.ly picked up because they did not know of the war.

After this initial

success, captures declined, but, in the Letters and Papers
relating to

th~,[irst

Dutch

W~r,

ona constantly reads about

English ships bringing in Dutch merchantmen, often laden

with valuable cargos.

Even when English .forttines were at

t~;Gardiner·and Atkinson, V, p. 118.

I25Ib;4•i I i p. 375.

Ibid,.; V; p. 119.
i~~Ioid.; v, pp. 200-201~

Ilild.; V, PP• 263 ...264.
1291sra., v, P· 233.
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their lowest, during the Battle of Dungeness, an English
..

frigate not in Blake's fleet.brought in two .Dutch merchantmen captured while homeward bound from Spain with
cargos of oil, wineJ hides. silver, tobacco and salt.1.30
In all, the English captured between eleven and fifteen
hundred Dutch merchant ships during the first war,131 a
heavy blow to the Dutch economy.
At this point, something should be said about the
relative

mat~rity

of the two navies.

One evidence of

this maturity was the fact that battles were no longer

as confused as in earlier naval engagements due to the
tactics of fj~ghting in line ahead formation.132

~1'11ile

there is ·considerable dispute as to whether the Dutch or
the English originated this battle formation and as to

exactly whon it was first used, the English, as can be
seen in the last three battles of the war, used it with
greatest effect.

The first official recognition that

has been found of the line as a naval tactic is contained in the Commonwealth Orders of 165J:
••• All the ships or every squadron shall
endeavor to keep in a line with their
chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled (which God forbidt), whereby
the said ship that wears the flag should
not come in· to do the service that is
.

.

mibid., III, ·p. 102 •

.. CJppenheim 1 p.. 307.•
132oardiner ~nd Atkinson, V, pp. 168-169.

requisite. Then every ship of said squad•
shall endeavor to keep in a line with
the.Admiral or he that commands in chl!f
next unto him, and nearest the enemy. )

~on

Another evidence

or

the maturity of the two navies, par-

ticularly of the English, was· the development during the
war of two distinct types of ·warships - the large capital
ship with firepower designed to smother the enemy in a

pitched battle and the commerce raider, a light, nimble
and swift frigate, able to prey on enemy trade at sea.134
Meanwhile the pressure

or

Monckts blockade made the

Dutch anxious to get out to sea as soon as possible; how•
ever, it took eight weeks tor Tromp to repair the damages

done to his fleet in the last battle.135 During this time
he was able to collect around one hundred ships, of which
he wrote: " ••• a good thirty of these ought to be struck

oft the list it better ones could be had in their place."136
While Tromp was collecting his fleet, Monck left a
screen of warships and took the major part of the fleet
home to Sole Bay on July 15 to be cleaned and reprovisioned.137

The amazing thing, is that while Monck was gone, Tromp had
no idea of his absence.138

By August, Blake was said to be

recovering enough to be able to get back to sea shortly;

l33Julian S.·Corbett (Ed.) 1 Fighting Instructions,
l!jJ0-1816 (London, 1905), p. lOv.
- ·
134Wilson, p. 64.
·
i~goardiner·and. Atkinson, V, pp. 150-152.
~ Ibid.; V, P• 203.
i~~!bid.; V; P• 255.

!Eid., v, P• 161.
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however, .Monck was still in command and by August 5, he
was back blockading the Dutch coast with his entire fleet

of .over one hundred ten saii.l.39
On August S, Tromp appeared with over one hundred
ahips.

His plan was to drawMonck away so that Dewith,
.

.

with some twenty•five sail, would be able to get to sea

and hopefully join Tromp.

Monck fell;for the bait and

chased Tromp, fiMting a brisk, four hour battle which
--

'

.

.'

ended with the English still having.the wind; however,
that night Tromp tacked northward and slipped past the
Engli.sh fleet.

The next day was stormy, but on the 10th

ot August, Tromp, joined by Dewithts fleet, gained the
wind and bore down on the English.
flict,

th~

In the ensueing con-

tw9. fleets .Passed through each other• s line ..

tour times, the fourth being the occasion
fighting.

or

the heaviest

As Monck wrote later, two Dutch flagships came

tP·· to the ttResolutiontt, "at which time the very heavens
were obscured by

smo~e,

the air rent with the thundering

noisel the sea all in a breach with the shot that fell,
the ships even trembling and we hearing everywhere messengers of .;peath
flying.ttl40
..
.

When the Dutch fleet broke·

oft the action, they had lost about fourteen ships sunk
139
' .
140Ibt~·;.
Ib ., Vv,,· P•
P• 3326a~
o.
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or burnt and Tromp killed by a musket shot.141 · The Eng- ·
lish raeet was greatly damaged in its masts and rigging
and had to put into port.142
After the defeat of their last attempt to destroy
the English fleet in,pitched battle and the death of Tromp,
the Dutch peace efforts, which had been in operation since
after the first conflict,143 were stepped up.

Although

the Dutahwere able to continuQ naval operations after the
Battle 0£ the Texel, as evidenced by Dewith's escorting
three hundred forty merchant ships with forty-three war-

ships around the northern route in September of 16.53,144
the strength ot their fleet was greatly reduced.

The

Dutch people were in favor of peace as early as November
of 16;2145 and Dutch envoys had been sent asking £or peace
on July 3, 1653 shortly after the Battle ot the Gabbard. 1 46
Although the war dragged on after the Battle of the Texel,
there were no more major battles and the misery and privations brought on by continued con£11et and restriction
of trade produced a desire for peace which resulted in the

Treaty of Westminster, May 1, 16;4.147
At this first treaty of Westminster; the English made

41
the harsh ·demands of the victor and the Dutch had to tone

tham down.

Cromwell wanted an annual sum from the Dutch

for the right to fish in English waters, compensation for
the Massacre of Amboina, punishment

or

sponsible for it, a limit on the number

the officials re•.

or

Dutch warships

in English waters, striking of the flag whenever meeting

English ships and the right of search.

While these de-

mands were pretty severe, the blockbuster was Cromwell's
desire that the Prince of Orange would never succede to
any of the offices and dignities held by his ancestors

and that he should never be appointed to military command.
De Witt realized that he could never get the Dutch
·people to agree to any of these demands, especially since
it meant allowing a foreign power to interfere in her internal affairs.

For this reason, De Witt prepared to

strengthen and continue the war effort.

But Cromwell's

desire tor peace was genuine and he conceded on minor
points and even said he would be content to allow the exclusion ot the Prince ot Orange to be included in a secret
article.

De Witt knew the Dutch would not even stand for

this, so he entered into clandestine negotiations with
Cromwell through the leading Dutch envoy, De Witt's· per•

sonal friend, VanBeverningh •. When told of the Dutch popu•
lar feeling on this .point, Cromwell agreed to be satisfied

1£ the Estates 0£ Holland alone affirmed a declaration that

the Prince of Orange be excluded.

In achieving this highly
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delicate diplomatic objective De Witt proved himself a
master of the «art of diplomatic chicanery and

_e "148

intrigu·~

The. Dutch agreed in the open treaty to pay compensation for
the Amboyna massacre 0£ 162.3, · to acqui.eace in regards to .

the Navigation Act,. to make annual payment for the right
of fishing in English waters and to

reoogni~e

the English

right of the f'lag.149

. , 148oeorge Edmundson, Historx of. Hollan~ {Cambridge,
1922)., pp. 220•222. For a further account or the f'asci- ·

na.tine story of De Witt's diplomatic maneuvers, see Ibid.,
PP• 2f 2•224.
.·
..
4~Iarcus, I, P• 147~

Chapter II

The Second Anglo-Dutch War
The termination of the first Dutch war allowed England to resume her interrupted policy in the Mediterranean
Sea.

Immediately after the peace with Holland the advan-

tage in the Mediterranean shifted back and forth; it was
becoming clear that the power that achieved supremacy in
this area would be the controlling force in Europe.

With

respect to the Mediterranean there were three clear leading
motives in the maze of mystery that was Oliver Cromwell's
foreign policy: (l) It was Cromwell's mission to become
the leader or a great protestant coalition to finally halt
the counter-reformation.

(2) The Elizabethan war against

Spain and alliance with France was to be revived with the
objective of opening the New World to British trade and
withdrawing British subjects from the jurisdiction of the
Inquisition in Spanish ports.

(J) Vengeance was to be

taken.for insults heaped on .England since she became a
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republic.l
Before war started with Spain, the greater part of
tha English fleet was sent into the Mediterranean Sea as

a show of force.

Like Nelson. Blake perceived the policy

of his superiors and dared to show them how it could be
carried out.

"So it is we see him, full of the love of

God and his.country, raging round the Mediterranean to

seek a foeman wort1lf o£ the weapon he has tempered, and
finding none."2 It was during this cruise th~t the English
navy wrote another.chapter in the progress ot naval science.
Blake's destruction of the Turkish fortress at Tunis was
the ·r1rst time that a fleet of ships had anchored close.·

under powerful batteries and crushed them by firepower

alone.3
Except for the continued employment given to the

sailors of the gnglish navy in a victorious naval war
'(highlighted by Blake's destruction.of the Spanish fleet
at Santa Grus, April 20, 1657); the Spanish War of 1655•
1660 was a failure.

The only benefit of the one military

fiasco of Cromwell's life, the so•called •western design•.
was the acquisition

or

Jamaica, a weak point in the Span•

iard's Carribean line of defense to which ·the English

~Corbett, England in t~~ Mediterranean, I, pp. 270·272.
Ibid., P• 3 0.
3!b1d., P• 307.
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retreated on being repulsed from their primnry objective,
San Domin80• . While the English were successi\.il in ta.king

Dunkirk from the Spanish, with French help, this bloody
victory was indecisive in promoting the protestant cause·
against the Catholic (in fact, an alliance with Catholic

France was used in taking Dunkirk).

While England main-

tained a .fleet, in the Mediterranean Sea throughout the
war and was well on the way to becoming the dominant power

in that area,4 English commerce suffered heavily from Span~
ish privateers, losing almost as many ships as they had
taken:from the Dutch in the first Anglo-Dutch war (England lost an estimated between one thousand and eighteen
hundred ships to the Spaniah).5

England emerged from the

Spanish war, which was ended at the Restoration of Charles
II, with a victorious navy, but a depleted merchant fleet.6
During the Spanish war and immediately after there
were many minor incidents that could have led to war between
England and the Netherlands.

The very fact that the two

nations did not go to war.at this time "was the first and
moat remarkable proof that neither conflicting economic
ambitions nor the problems of neutral rights need necessar•

ily lead to war if those· who held power exercised prudence

and restraint."? In April

4a.

or

1662, De Witt allowed the

M. Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts (New York,
1904)• PP• 308·311.
.
;;1Davis, p. 51. · .
6Ib1d.,·p. 316.
7Wi!aon, pp. 80-g1.
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English to arrest several regicides (Okey, Barkstead
and Corbet} ·and send them to England for execution.

This

was a move designed to smoothe relations between monarch·

iat England and republican Holland, and, while ·the Dutch·
still distrusted the·· English· enough to enter into a de-

fensive alliance with France {On April 27, 1662, the French
and Dutch

p~omised

to aid each other in a European war pro-

vided the other was not an aggressor.), the English and
Dutch agreed, in another Treaty of Westminster, September

l~,· 1662, to aid each other against their rebels.a
Because the English navy was neglected

immedi~tely

after the death of Oliver Cromwel19 and because of the.

failure or the Spanish War, there was a belief among·historians that Cromwell had no influenae on English history
in the field of foreign affairs. and that nothing survived
him.

In his work, England in the Mediterraneal'\, J.

s.

Corbett holds this belief to be false:
In all that concerned the.British attitude
to the outside world he changed much and
left much behind him. He £ound his country
impotent and neglected in the councils 0£
h1urope, and taught her how to speak with
a commanding voice. He gave her, in the
first place,, the instrument - a perfected
navy in the true modern sense - a navy of
war ships wholly independent of merchant
. auxiliaries - a thing which had never yet
been seen in modern times. It was a stride

Bogg, I, p.·247.

9p. J. Blok; ffj.storv · or the People ot the Netherlands
(New York, 1907), Vo1. I~, p. JI?.
.
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as great as that which Drake and his fellows made when they pertected a sailing
navy, and the results for England.were
no.less invigorating. But Cromwell gave
still more~ He gave.the sentiment for
using the instrument. For he bequeathed
to the restored monarchy a definite naval
policy in the Mediterranean and an indestructible ambition ror what we now call
imperial politics.! 0 ·
The fighting ships

or

the Restoration navy were pro-

vided with skilled personnel and training in seamanship
by the great trading companies, most notably the East India

Company, the Newfoundland fisheries and the fleets ot New•
castle colliers.

Three alms houses were maintained for old

seamen and widows and children

or

seamen by Trinity House,

a corporatioi:i rounded in the reign or Henry VIII to assess
rates for pilotage, appoint fit pilots

a~~

to·maintain lights

on the coast, buoys, beacons, etc.ll Under the later Stuarts
there was specialization in material and personnel and the
Navy was more definitely dissociated from the Mercantile
)18.rin~.

No one could fly the Union Jack without a license

from the Lord ·High Admiral; merchant captains could only
f'ly the red ensiBn•

His Majesty's stores were marked with

the broad arrow and all

ro~es

used by the Royal Navy were

distingtiished by a white strand in order to aid in detection
when stolen.12

i~Oorbett, E1'gland in the Mediterranean,.II, pp. 1-2.
Ogg, l, P• 254. in wartime al! the buoys were taken
in so that an enemy could not navigate English.waters. J.
R. Tanner (Ed.), Samuel Pepys' Naval Minutes (London, 1926),
P• 44

·

·

.

12ogg, l, P• 269.
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Life on board a Stuart warship was more informal than
one would expect; an "immoderate number
drunkff, great quantities

or

or

healths were

ammunition were wasted in sa-

lutes on the flimsiest pretext, and women friends of the·
crew were allowed on board and sometimes remained aboard
ship for extended periods 0£ time.

Pay for sailors at the

end of the reign of Charles II was only slightly higher
than during the first Dutch war.

A fleet vice-admiral was

paid fifty shillings a day, while a captain of a first rate
received twenty-one pounds a month and the captain ot a
sixth rate collected seven ·pounds a month..

The lieutenant

received between tour pounds four shillings and two pounds
sixteen shillings a month;' the master between seven and
four pounds a month and the boatswain slightly less than
the lieutenant.

The gunner, purser and carpenter received

four pounds a month, while the surgeon and cook were paid
two pounds ten shillings and one pound five shillings•
respectively.

The able-bodied seaman and the ordinary

seaman received the same as they did in the l650's, while
a ship's boy was paid nine shillings sixpence a month.13
One often reads, in the contemporary accounts of the

period and in secondary accounts, or the difficulty the
navy had in recruiting sailors.

The main reason for this,

aside ·rrom the fact ·that a ·man's chances of losing his lite

13Ibid., P• 27;.
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in the Royal Navy were greater, was

th~t

a sailor could .

get higher wages .·serving in an English merchant ship.

Wages for merchant seamen rose during wartime and fell
during peace (the exception to this rule was just after
the London fire when great numbers

or

experienced seamen

were needed to bring in the timbe:r needed to rebuild the

city.).

During the .first Dutch war, the. wages of merchant

sailors were between thirty and.thirty-eight shillings a
month.

After this war, they fell to between.twenty-three

and twenty-four shillings and then climbed back up to
between thirty and thirty-eight during

th~

Spanish War.

After 1660, the .wages or merchant seamen £ell to twenty
shillings or less, but

du~ing

the Second Dutch War they

reached between thirty-five and thirty-eight a month.
Once again wages for merchant seamen fell when the need
for' them was not as· great, but this time not· as lotti,

only to between twenty-seven and thirty shillings a month.
During the last.Dutch war, a merchant seaman could earn

b~tween thirty-five and forty shillings a month.14
Another condition in the lite of the Stuart seaman
was the punishment meted out to minor offenders.

By our

standards, this punishment alone would seem to be enough
to cause a sailor in the Royal_Navy to seek employment
elsewhere, but by .seventeenth century standards the pun-

14navis, p~ 1)5.
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ishment was relatively lenient.15

Minor offences were

punished thusly:
l. For swearing and· drunkenness, forfeiture
or one day's pay.
2. For· telling a lie, able-bodied seamen'
and inferior ratings were to be hoisted on
the main-stay, having a broom and shovel
tied to their backs, and to remain in this
posture tor half an hour; while the ship's
company cried out 'A liar, A liar'.
For ratings above that of able-bodied sea•
men forfeiture or one day's pay.
3• For ·theft, the culprit to be towed ashore,
and the amount made good out or his wages.
4. For going ashore without leave, forfeiture
of two days• pay.
5. Neglect of watch, forfeiture or one day's
pay.
.
o. Defiling the decks, not-more than twelve

lashes.16

The period 0£ the later Stuarts was one of the most
formative in English naval history because ot the steady
improvement in administration and the accumulation of a
vast fund ot experience in the hard struggles with the
Dutch.

Between 1660 and 167.3 there were added to the one

hundred fifty-six ships in existence in 1660 a total or
one hundred forty-seven vessels, an .increase of sixty
thousand tons, twenty thousand men and four thousand guns.
Losses incurred in the Dutch Wars were more than made
good.17
In line with most of the restoration settlement, the

i~Ogg, I, P• 275.
Ibid., PP• 274-275.
17Ibi<r:, P• 280.

;1
existing Admiralty and Navy Commissioners were temporarily
kept in office and such old parliamentarian officials as
Penn, _.-Batten and Pater and Phineas Pett ware kept and worked
harmoniously with Royalists such as Slingsbie, sir George·
Carteret and Lord Berkeley of Stratton.

The only major

change that occurred at the Restoration was the revival .
of the office of Lord High Admiral with the Duke of York

being appointed to £,ill this position.ls
The Lord High Admiral's principal officers, Carteret
(treasurer), Slingsbie (controller), Batten (surveyor) and

Pepys (clerk ot the acts), worked with .the Navy commission-

ers, Berkely, Penn, Peter Pett and William Coventry (appointed in 1662).

The Navy Board, or Lord High Admiral's

Advisory Council, made contracts; paid ships' companies, ·
regulated rates of pay, selected candidates for commissions
and supervised dockyards and naval ship-building.

The

Navy Board had summary jurisdiction over seamen committing

riots on shore and over dockyard employees.

The treasurer

paid estimates and, obtained his funds from the treasury.
The controller kept duplicate accounts and supervised victualling.

The surveyor kept himself i?Jformed of the state

of ships and dockyards, and the clerk of the acts served as
secretary and kept minutes.and records.

The advantage of

this system was that it associated the personal initiative

l8Ibid., PP• 257-258.
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of a Lord High Admiral such as James, Duke of York, with
the competence and energy of men like Pepys and Coventry.19
During the third Dutch war, the Test Act forced James
to give up his office, so his powers lapsed to Charles II,
who delegated them to a commission made up

or

Prince Rupert,

Shaftesbury, Osborne,. Anglesey, Buckingham, Monmouth and
Lauderdale - men not distinguished £or maritime service
(with the exception, of course, of Rupert).

Thus there

was created an Admiralty Board, with no technical knowledge,
but supreme executive and military functions working with a
Navy Board.possessing considerable administrative experience,
.

.

but little or no executive authority.

While, in theory,

these two bodies should have supplemented each other, in
practice they generally overlapped.

However, this defect

was offset somewhat by the fact that James, in spite of
his exclusion from office, continued to exercise considerable influence throughout the third Dutch war.20
The chief merit of the Duke of York as an administrator was that he recognized and appreciated ability and
industry when he saw them and that he used the authority
of hi-s rank to uphold the best of his subordinates against

the intrigues.of interested parties.

For this reason

James can claim no first hand credit for the reforms that
made the British Navy a power in European politics,- but
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his importance is that he

show~d

intelligence.in recog•

nizing the outstanding genius 0£ men such as Pepys and ·
Coventry and.steady loyalty in constantly supporting them.21
The main difficulty in naval administration of the·
mid-seventaenth century was lack of money.

legislators did not comprehend the expense

The English

or

an adequately

maintained.fleet and especially its increased.cost in time

of war.

The coat 0£ the peace-t.ime Navy

at

the Restoration

was four hundred thousand pounds a year and by'l670 it had
increased to five hundred thousand pounds.

This was one-

third. of the total revenue that ·parliament thought necessary

tor national services. but failed to provide.

The first

two years of the Second Dutqh War cost three million pounds,
almost all or it spent on naval expenditure •. The consequences of the shortages 0£ money were that the seamen ·

were unpaid, supplies had to be bought high prices (sometimes as high as forty per cent more) because

.or

the low

level of government credit and,, due to a dearth of money
to pay for necessary repairs, some ships had to be put out

of commission.22
Recruiting of new seamen, a hard job at best, was
even more difficult because a sailor's lot·was likely to

be semi-starvation and extreme poverty.

In fact, condi-

tions were so bad for seamen that there were an estimated

2lp.

c.

Turner 1 James II (New York, 1948), p. 72.
.

22ogg, I, pp. i!60-262. . '
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three thousand English and Scottish seamen serving in the
Dutch fleets throughout the last

t\\fO

Dutch wars._2 3

The

food of· the last two Dutch wars was often bad :beer, moldy
bread and meat from animals wh:tch had died natural deaths,~ 2 4

In order to supply the needs of the Royal Navy sailors

'
were often impressed from homeward-bound ships, although
colliers, fishing boats, transports and the barge

or

the

Archbishop 0£ Canterbury were theoretically exempt from
the press.

Iv!any seamen were .recruited from the wherries

(passenger and freight rowboats} of the Thames.

The mari•

time counties we:r'e scoured of men who lociked as if they

knew something about salt.water.

So great was the shortage
;

of men during the last two Dutch wars, especially between

1665 and 1667; that .farmers and teamsters were pressed.
Those picked up by the press were oi'ten old men,

children~

or the diseased. ·In the second Dutch war, the shortage

was so great that sixth rate ships were laid up in order·
to provide crews for the larger vessels.

In the third

Dutch war, voluntary enlistment was encouraged by giving
a bounty of six weeks' pay and a certificate, indicating
that.the sailor had served in the Royal Navy at such and

such adate.25

Because of the lack of .funds with which

2JThis was in spite of the fact that they were subject
to immediate lynching if caught by their former countrymen.
Ibid.
.

. •. ··24Ibi d.

25lbid;, pp. 263-264.
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to pay the seamen, the navy resorted· to a policy of paying
off ships where the least sum paid off the most men.

The

result was that those who had served least were more likely
to get paid than those who had served most and needed their
money more.26
The gradual elimination of the superiority in tone and
discipline in the navy which had bean carried over from the

Commonwealth period has been attributed to nthe corrupting
influence of· court favor in a licentious government".27
In fact, it may have been duo to William Coventry that the
English navy had any capable officers at all.

Despite

considerable opposition, he continued to press for the re-

employment of professional sailors of the interregnum and
to promote promising officers. 2 8
In the 1660•a, the Dutch government, while not yet
gaining full efficiency, had done much to correct some of
the major causes £or its defeat in its first war with
England.

Before the first Anglo-Dutch war1 'the basically

unmilitary States General• conservative in money matters•
had allowed its fleet to degenerate into a mere assembly
of armed merchantmen, due partly to long and easy victory
over the decrepit navy of Spain.29

It was largely due to

the leadership of John De Witt, who only started to attain

~~Tanner,. .F'efs' Naval Minute~, p. 66.
Mahan f ' p.

o:C.

2~18.han. p.

126.

2Sw11aon, p. lJ6.
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political power on the death of Adrian Pauw, the old leader of the Reeents, that the Dutch recovered so rapidly
£rom their defeat.JO
De Witt was a financier and organizer of the highest
order who also displayed a swiftness of courageous decision
in momenta of emergency.

The immediate effect of the first

Dutch war was to.show the Dutch how inferior in size and
armament their war•vessela were to the English.

De Witt's

reaction to this realization was to undertake a· complete
re-organization

or

the Dutch fleet.

The custom of con"

verttng merchantmen into ships of war at- the outbreak of
hostilities was abandoned and large, strongly ccnstructod,
powerfully armed men-of-war,. carrying sixty, seventy, or

eighty guns, ·were built.

As usual the Dutch ships were

specially built to pass in and out of the shallow waters
along the Dutch coastline, but they were built for strength
rather than speed.·

While the major reform was carried out

in the size and strength of the large ships, De Witt did
not fail to notice the small, lightly armed, swift-sailing
English frigates.

De Witt had this. type of vessel copied

to be used for scouting and preying on the enemyf s commerce
in the event of another war.

Aside from the reforms in

shipbuilding, the supply and training of seamen was revised

JOEdmundson, p. 218.
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and re-organized as was the whole system

or

prize-money

and pay.31

The Dutch comeback had started as early as 1657 ,. when

they checked the French insults against their commerce and
in 1658 they checked the Swedish power in the Baltic and
regained control of the entrance to that inland waterway •..32

While the Netherlands had recaptured most or the power and
prestige lost in the first Dutch war, their continued power
and even their daily bread depended on peace.

Their highly

organised credit had been severely.strained by the first

war; an example of .this is that they paid a yearly interest

ot five hundred thousand pounds on war debts.

Another

reason why the Dutch government would not want war was that
it was likely to upset the republic and bring the Orange

family back to power.33
Charles II's first Dutch war sprang from
those national antagonisms which defy the
most pacific of governments., Feuds and
conflicts accumulated for half a century
were pressing for solution, and to solve
them without recourse to arms would have
asked, on either side, a rare magnanimity
coupled with absolute power. But magnanimity could not be expected from mercantilism, and both Charles II and De
Witt depended for political existt_\nce on
mercantile support.J4
Here we have the basic aause 0£ the second Anglo-Dutch
.
":..

~~Ibid.; PP• .225-228.
.
t1ahan, p. 96.
.
·
33Keith Feiling, )3ritish Foreim Policy ·1660-1672
.1930), P• 8l.,. ,
bid.;. P• 83 •
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war •. the fact that the commercial jealousies, the nun1erous

conflicts between the English and Dutch in the Baltic and
Mediterranean Seas and the trade antagonisms· in the East
Indies, West Indies and West Africa had not been settled·
by the first

Dutch war.35 While Charles II•s personal

hatred for John De Witt may have had some influence in

bringing on· the seconci war,J6 Charles cannot receive
full blame:for starting this war.
A gr-eat share in the responsibility for the second
Dutch war must go to the English merchants, especially the
East India Company, tor their constant complaints against
the Dutch.

The East India Company presented the govern•

ment with a long list of vessels confiscated· by the Dutch
between the years 1654•1659 and valued at three hundred
thousand pounds.
as

an

The Dutch had paid fitty thousand pounds

indemnity with regards to· three specified ships under

an· agreement

or

1659 and contended that this must eliminate

all previous 'claims•· but the East India Oompany ·continued

to present its· claims and complaints against the Dutch before
the government of Charles II.37
Reinforcing the.pressure of the merchants on the gov•
ernment was the belief that the economic conditions

or

pros..

35p. J. Bloki The Lire of: Admira~ De Ru~er, (London,
P• 203.
·
.
.
.,6stephen Baxter, William III and the·nerense·9f f4lE:!!::
Eean,Ltbertf 1620•lfO~ (New York, 1906), P• 32.

1933)~

37Feil ng. P• . 02.

pe.rity during the first

Anglo~Dutch

English success in that war.
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war were due to the

Coupled with this mistaken

belier was the £act that the English merchants had suf-

fered heavily in.the war with the -Spanish and believed
that they could more than make good their losses in
another war with the Dutch.36

Under this barrage

or

pressure from the merchants,

the government was roroed to take actions short ot war
against the Dutch, actions which in themselves could
heighten.the tensions between England and Holland and lead

dangerously to war,.

One action that .the government took

was to publish and distribute anti-Dutch literature, such
as an anonymous government publication, Dutch Boare
d~s.aected;

o;r: a Description of .W'Hogg•lf!n~• which said, "A

Dutchman is a lusty .• Fat 1 Two-legged Cheese-Worm.

A crea•

ture that is so Addicted to eating Butter, Drinking Fat
Drink and Sliding,. that all the World knows him for a
Slippery Fellow.

An Hollander is not a High-Lander

b 1 .1.~;

but a Low-Lander' For he loves to be down in the Dirt,
and Boarlike., ·to wallow therein.n·~9

The £use of the.second Dutch war powderkeg was ignited

in Guinea, a section of West Africa where the Dutch and
English, as in In.dia, were contesting the remains or an

ancient Portuguese dominion. . The seizure of New. Amsterdam

in October ot-1664 _did not bother the Dutch as much as a

5~wilson, p. 149.
Ibid., p. 126.
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strong English attempt earlier that year to·gain control
of Oape Verde in Guinea.

While the Dutch had apparently

written off their colony in America as not worth the tre• ·
mendous cost it ltould take to de.fend it, they felt so

strongly about keeping their_possession in West Africa
that in October they ordered a fleet in the Mediterranean

under De Ruyter to proceed to Guinea.40
The Dutch did not want war and be.fore taking the ·giant
step of sending De Ruyter to West Africa, ·Dutch ambassadors
at·· London had repeatedly protested the English acts of ag•

gression in New Netherlands and Guinea, with about the
same results that such strongly worded protests rneet today.
The English reaction to the Dutch decision to send De Ruyter
was to begin a war of reprisal in November, 1664, attacking

Dutch merchant ships and capturing over a hundred by the
New Year.

The stage that follows diplomatic feverishness

before it touches the crisis of war had been reached by
November, 1664 and from then on both nations cancelled
sailing orders, n1assed their .fleets

~n

home waters and

laid an embargo on merchant shipping.41 It was not until
a Saturday in March.,1665 that the King's declaration: of
war was solemnly proclaimed at Westminster-by two heralds
in coats of arms, accompanied by tour mace-bearers, nine
40
.
. .
Ibid., pp., 125•132. ·
41Felling, PP• 125·135.
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trumpeters and two troops of horse and greeted with great
shouting and rejoicing by the people.42
To carty out the ·English .objective 0£ hindering Dutch

trade, a large fleet of over a hundred sail was concentrated
0££ the ·enemy's principal base at the Texel under the com-

mand of the Duke of York and his subordinates, Prince Ru-

pert and the Earl of Sandwich.

In this position, the Eng•

lish cut off .the bulk of the Dutch navy from the smaller
Zealand squadron and could block the commerce

or

Amsterdam,

forcing the Dutch to either fight at a disadvantage or lose

their vital convoya.43

The governing .factor of this .plan

was how long the English could remain at sea, and it was
due to James' failure to heed the lessons

or

the first war

that the English had to abandon their station and lose the
initiative.

James did not provision his fleet at all well,

considering he was planning a long blockading action, and
had to put back into port to revictual after only three or

four weeks at sea.44
'l'he Dutoh joined their two fleets and gave chase under
the command of a former cavalry officer, ,Opdarn.4.S He had .

been

plac~d

in .command because De Ruyter was still at sea,·
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but he was not allowed to oper.'lte on his own initiative;

he had been given strict orders to seek the enemy out and
This interference with a commander

do battle with him.

in the field or afloat has been throughout history one of
the most common temptations t:,o a eovernment, and it has
usually resulted in disa.ster.i~6
The· two fleets met off Lowesto.ft on tho Norfolk coast

on -.Tune 13, 1665.

Even though the Dutch van gavo way in

the beginning o£·the fight, ·the battle was fairly even
until the Dutch center, Opdam•s squadron, crumbled.

A

junior a<l:niral in this squadron had been killed and his

crew panicked and mutinied, taking his ship out of tho

aation.

The ships intmediately around the deserting ship

did not know the cause of this movement, but· most assumed
this was being done on order of Opdam, so twelve or thirteen other ships did the same, leaving a huge gap in the
Dutch line.

Opdam was unable to signal these ships to

return to the fight, so, in a desperate effort to save
the day, he headed straight for the flagship of the Duke

of York, but in the ensueing struggle, his ship was blo\ill
up and he was killed•

The Dutch retreated unde:r the cover

of Admiral Tromp47_and, although there is a long, involved
46
.
0
Mahan. P• lOo.
47This Admiral Tromp was the son or the Admiral Tromp
that commanded the Dutch Navy during the first war and was
killed at the Battle of the Texal, the last battle of that
war. Ibid., p. 109.
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story as to why the English failed to pur_sua,48 the most
logical reason is that their masts and rigging were so
crippled by the Dutch firo that they were unable to give
chase.49

Beoause the Dutch fleet had been able to retreat to
safety and the English had not pursued, the defeat was not

as bad for the Dutch as it could have been; however it !'Jas
a stinging defeat.

The Dutch lost sixteen ships sunk or

destroyed, nine captured, two thousand men killed (including three admirals) and about two thousand men captured.

The English lost one ship sunk, less than a third .

as many men ~<illed50 and among the dead only one adm:tral.

The Dutch people were so upset and angry about ·the defeat

that they threw the elder Evei;tson, who had been second in
command, in the sea and threw stones at him.51
Throughout the early part of the war, the French tried
to mediate for peace between the two bolligerants, but the

English victory in the battle of Lowestoft made the English
terms in any treaty with the Dutch too hard for the Dutch
4SThe popular story for the English failure to pursue
.
the Dutch after this battle was that Janies's personal secretary, Brouncker, had had encueh of the fight and wanted
to leave the deck. · In order to prevent the suspicion that
he was a coward, he pretended that he was entering the Duke's
cab;tn because he had an order to shorten sail. The Captain
of the ship believed him and did not wake James up to verify
his order, so·that by the time James awoke, The Dutch were
gone. Oeg, I, P• 288.
49Edmundaon; p. 273.
SOWilson; P• 2)7.
5logg, I, p. 288. He was rescued by some of his sailors,
only to be eourt-martialed, along with several captains, but
he was acquitted at his court-martial. Edmundson, P• 237.
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to stomach.52

Fortunately for the D11tch, the .English did

not fully exploit their victory.53

Immediately afte:t."

Lowestoft, Prince Rupert and Prince James went ashore to
enjoy the .fruits of victory, leaving the Earl of Sandwich
in conunand of the .fleet.

Sandwich was in a position to

pull off one of' the greatest English victories of all three
wars,. for l4ichael De Ruyter was returning .from punishing

the English on the West coast of Africa, in the West Indies
and off Newfoundland.

He was loaded down with prizes a;nd

his fleet was barely seaworthy, a certain prey for an

Adtniral in conunand of the North Sea. but Sandwich got tired
0£

waiting for hirn and tried to hit the Dutch elsewhere.54

In the Danish harbor of Berzen was a rich Dutch mer•
chant .fleet which had fled there seeking safety from the
English.

The neutral Danish king offered, for a share of

the booty,· to allow the English fleet to attack the Dutch
merchant ships, but a misunderstanding arose -vihile the

English warships were entering the harbor and the guns of
the Danish forts opened fire on the English,-killing and
wounding four hund1--ed men; among the dead were six Eng-

lish aaptaina.

To get out of the mess he waa in, the

Danish king allied with the United Provinces and declared

52F'eiling; PP• 144-145.
53rvr. A. L. Pontalia. John De Witt Grand Penaionar! or
Twent7 years of !'.!. Parlirunentarv RePublic (London, 1883~, '
Vo!.
P• 33~l. .
·
·
·
·
. 5~corbett,. E_ngland i,n the Mediterraneari, II, p. ;6.

war on England.55
h'hile Sandwichts fleet was occupied in tho Borgen

fiasco, De Ruyter's fleet sailed north around Scotland and
into the Texe1 •.56 The Earl thought he had compensated

far

his blunder by capturing a convoy o.f nine Dutch East Indiamen valued at two hundred thousand pounds, but he made the
mistake of distributing some of the plunder to his offi ..
cers without conununicating with James and getting permission.

This gave his personal enemies, Monck (now t,he

Duke of .Albemarle) and Cov<mtry, an excellen-t opportunity
to reoove ·t,he Earl of Sandwich from a position

ence.

or

influ-

Sandwich narrowly escaped impeachment and endl)d up

as ambassador to Spain.57
The importance of Sandwich•s downfall lay in the fact
that he, along with Penn and James., were the .foremost mem-

bers

or

the so-oalled ttformal" schoo! of thought of English

naval tactics.

These commanders put their faith in rules

and were prepared to spend much time in maneuvering for
position. whereas their opposites in naval tactical thought,
the so-called "dashing" school, represented by Albemarle
and Rupert, believed· in hard fightinz and taking risks in
order to secure an advantage.

The time spent in maneuvering

at Lowestoft and the failure to press the advantage dis-

55G. · H. Clark, The. _Later St~art.s 1660-l:Zl!t (Oxford,
1934) fr PP• 62-6) •.
.
~ocorbett, Enp;la·nd in th~ Mediterranean, lI, p. 56 •
.-170gg,

I, PP•

2~0-2Sii.

·

.

.
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credited the "formal" school) resulting in tha superceasion

of York and Sandwich by Albemarle and Rttport.58
But before the "dashing" school had a chance to prove
itself, gngland was stricken by·the ·last of ,the great outbreaks· of bubonic .plague • .59

In the words of Bishop Gil-

.bert, Burnet, a contemporary chronicler:
••• as soon as the war broke,out, a most
terrible Plague broke out also in the
city of London, that scattered all.the
inhabitants that were able to remove
themselves elsewhere~ . It broke the trade
of the nation, and swept away about an
. hundred thousand souls; the greatest
havock that any Plague had ever made in
England.· Thi$ did dishearten all peo•
ple: And, coming in the very time in
which so unjust a war was begun,·it .had
a dreadful appearance. All the King's
enemies and the enemies of Monarchy said;
here was a manifest character of God's
·heavy displeasure upon the Nation; as
indeed the ill 11.fe the King led, and
the visciousness or the whole Court, gave
but a melancholy prospect.60
When Michael De Ruyter reached home in August of 166.5;
his fleet of nineteen sail and seven prizes filled with
sugar and five or six chests of gold was in bad shape.

His

sails and cordage were badly out of order and there was
less than six days' victuals left. for his tleet.61

Tromp

had been appointed admiral in De Ruyter's absence, but·upon
.

-

his hoped for, but unexpected,return De Ruyter was appointed

Vol.
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to command the Dutch fleet, which numbered at this time
ninety-three men-ot•war,. twelve .fireships and twenty gal•
liots and speed yachts. , The warships carried £orty-three
hundred guns and twenty thousand men, of whom four thou-·
sand six hundred were marines.62
With their spirits lifted greatly by the return of
De Ruyter,6.'.3 the Dutch set out to build .the finest fleet
they had ever sent to sea.

The fleet that left the Dutch

coast in search of the English fleet in early June consisted

or

eighty-four warships, thirteen frigates, eight

yachts and four fireships •. Although the number·of warships
De·Ruyter·commanded in June of 1666 was less than that he
had assumed command of in-August, 166;, the number of guns,
forty•six hundred, and the number of men, over twenty-two
thousand, was greater.. over thirty of these men-01"-war
were of greater

atren~th

than the biggest

Du~ch

ships

or

the previous year.94Before De Ruyterts fleet set siail, .·the Dutch had

achieved a diplomatic success which, as it worked out,
enabled them to win·the longest, bloodiest battle 0£ the
wars•, Through·

their.~

earlier defensive alliance with France

they were able to persuade Louis. XIV that it was to his

advantage to join them against the English. While in

reality, French naval strength was much weaker than the
English thought, the very existence of a French squadron
whose avowed

pu~pose

was to link up with the Dutch in the

North Sea was enough to profoundly affect the naval cam-:
paign

or

1666.65

After the French declaration of

war~

Sir Jeremy Smith

was ordered into the Mediterranean in command of a strong
squadron whose mission was primarily convoy duty to pro•
tect the English Levant trade.

The French assembled a

fleet, under the command of Beaufort. which consisted of
thirty French men•ot-war, besides fire-ships and au.xiliaries, and eight Dutch ships.

While this sounds like an

impressive fleet, the flotilla was feln by its commander
to be so weak, that he would not move it until it was
reinforced by a squadron of twelve galleys, ships which
were rapidly becoming relics 0£ the past.66
Monck overestimated the French strength in the
iterranean (the major action

or

Med~

the ·Dutch in this war in

the Mediterranean was to serve as auxiliaries to the
French) and pulled out a force which, in J.

s.

Corbettts

estimation could have easily put an end to the danger ot
the French.

Monck was not of this opinion-and, moreover,

he .felt Smith's squadron was needed at home for the great

6SEdmundson, p. 239.
6°corbett, England in the Mediterranean,. II, pp. 54.;5.
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push against the Dutch.

As soon as ·English strength in

the Mediterranean Sea disappeared with the last of Smith's
men-or-war, Beaufort moved his force out of the Mediter•
ranean and up the Spanish coast to Lisbon.

This move was

immediately misinterpreted by Charles II as a major attempt
by the French fleet to link up with the Dutch and, in an
effort to intercept the "French Fleet'', the King detached

Rupert's squadron from the main .fleet and sent it to the

Isle o~ Wight.67
On the first day ot June, 1666, the two fleets met ot£

the French coast near Dunkirk.6e The splitting ot the Duke
0£ Albemarle•s fleet did not bother him perhaps as much as
it should, for· before the battle he was so certain of vic1

tory that his only fear was that the Dutch fleet might not

come out.69 When Monck first spied the enemy fleet he
noticed at once the weakness of the Dutch order of battle

and bore down on Tromp•s squadron.

Tromp cut his cables

and made sail on the same tack as Monck. · The Dutch rear
and center also cut their cables and moved to join the
battle, but could not come into the action between Tromp
and Monck for some time.

In his haste to attack Tromp·

before he could be assisted by the main part of the Dutch
fleet, V10nck had left some of his slower ·ships behind.

liibid.i PP• 56-61.
Mahan, · p. 118.
69 Burnet, p. 321 •.
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As these ships crune up.to assist Monck, they were met by
·the Dutch center, under, De Ruyter, who was coming up to

aid Tromp.
· Some of the heaviest fighting of that £irst day oc··
curred at this point:and the. English were rather badly
mauled, losing two flagships, one by a. fireship.

Another

English Admiral, Sir John Harman. was . also heavily en--

gaged, but he fought valiantly, drawing his sword to keep

his panicky crew in line.

He was wounded by a topsail

yard, which was sheared 0££ by Dutch fire, falling on his
leg and breaking it.

The Dutch.vice-admiral; the younger

Evertson, saw Harman's plight and bore down on him, offering him quarter.

Harman·• s answer to this was

·~,

no, it

is not come to that yet,n and he ordered his men to fire

a

broad~ide

at the Dutch ship, which killed Evertsen and

drove the other ships off.• 70

While the English had lost.more heavily than the Dutch,
they had won a tactical victory because Monck had taken

advantage of the Dutch weakness and attacked a superior
force in such a way that only part
action.

0£.

it could come into

On the second day of the action, the Dutch, who

outnumbered the English ships by eighty to.forty-four,
were still in a.badly formed line of battle.

Tromp tried

to correct this detect by an independent action which
7~han. pp. 119-121.•
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exposed him to the full fire ot the English fleet.

De

Ruyter saw that Tromp was cut off and hauled up to him

and, because of the superior Dutch numbers, the English
broke off the action.71
After the English retired, Monck .started to retreat

towards his
Rupert•s

coast~

in the hopes that he could link up with

squadron~

On the third

day of the battle, he·

continued the retreat, burning three disabled ships, sanding ahead.the most.crippled and bringing up the rear with
the ships that were most in fighting condition, some sixteen to.twenty-eight men-o.f-war.

The fact that the Dutch.

were unable to seriously slow Monck 1 s steady and orderly
retreat shows that they had been hurt almost as much as
the English.·

Towards evening of the third

day Rupert's squadron

was spotted and the two English un.its linked up during
the night.· The next day, the Dutch had the weather.gauge,
but Monck and

~pert

battle raged all

attacked as soonaa they could.

~long

The

the line with the two fleets firing

broadsides at each other for two hours before the English
turned . and charged through the Dutch line, destroying all
regularity of order •. Although the action was thoroughly
confused, the Dutch, for the· most part, continued to .con-

trol the wind and eventually the English were f oraed to
71Ibid., pp. 121-122.
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retire.72

One of 'the best contemporary accounts there is ot
the Four Days' Battle is a letter .from Sir Thomas Clifford.
who had been sent expressly by the court

or

Charles II

to

gain the fullest information.about the battle, to ·Lord
Arlington.

Clitf'ord left England in a small, fast shallop

of six guns on Friday night and reached the scene of the'
battle at eight o'clock the next morning. ·.. By eleven

o'clock his small sloop was in the midst .of the battle
and by two o•clook, Clifford was able to.board the ·Royal
Charles, Monok's flagship.

For two or three hours, the

battle looked good for the English, but then five of the

bigger English ships, second and third ratest were forced
by their shattered condition to withdraw from the action.

During that night and the next day, Sunday, Menck
conducted his retreat in good order, with sixteen of the
largest and least damaged

or

the thirty-four fighting ships

he had left bringing up the rear and shoving the other
ships before him in a line.

"Tfl with the top of the

"T~

The formation looked like a

being the rearguard and the

perpendicular line the disabled ships heading tor England.
Monok maintained this order throughout Sund-ay until about
three that afternoon when the fleet of Prince Rupert was

seen, causing much rejoicing and shouting in the English

72Ib1d., PP• 123-125.
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fleet.
In an effort to join Prince Rupert the English fleet
passed a little too close to the·Galloper sands

a~d

sev-

eral ships, the Royal Charles, the Royal Katherine and
the Royal Prince ran aground, but tho Royal Charles and
the Royal.Katherine ware able to free themselves • . The

Royal Prince, however, drew much.more water than the others
and stuck fast, while the Dutch frigates sailed quickly
towards her •. Then, to Clifford's dismay, the captain and
crew ot the Royal Prince surrendered without a shot being
fired at or by' the enemy.
On Monday morning, the Dutch had the weather gauge,
but Monck and.Rupert.were fully joined and decided to
attack.

Led by some of their braver commanders, Sir

Christophe~

Mings and Sir Robert Holmes, the English

charged the Dutch line and broke through in several places.
Although the English on several occasions managed to divide
the Dutch fleet temporarily, the Dutch showed great skill
in reforming their battle order..
afternoon

1
,

About five o'clock that

the English divided the Dutch fleet so badly

that it appeared as 1£ that portion of the Dutch fleet to

the leeward of the Royal Charles was setting all the sail
they could to make a run for it.
pursuit, picking up some of the

The English started in

dama~e,d

Dutch ships, when

suddenly• that part of the Dutch fleet that was to windward
of the Royal Charles tacked in upon the English, separating

74

the Duke of Albemarle's squadron from Prince· Rupert's
squadron. ·Throughout the rest of this hot and·heavy
battle, Monck tried to fight his way back to Rupert.
which he was finally able to do at the end of the battle
when the Dutch broke off ·contact.
Because of the heavy damage done by the English to
the Dutch and disregarding the heavier damage done by the
Dutch to the English, Clifford considered this battle to
be an English victory.

He

was sure that. if the English

replenished their supplies of ammunition and other pro·-

visions and quickly paid·off their sailors, the.English
could be ready to.put to sea before the Dutch, and then
the world would see ·Who won the battle.

On the other hand,

Clifford had nothing but contempt for those English, those
"cowardly ones", who had quit the battle.

He ended his

letter to I..ord Arlington with a very conservative estimate.
of the English losses,·· eight hundred killed ·and fifteen

hundred wounded, and not more than·five ships sunk, destroyed or captured by the enemy.73
The Dutch considered the Four; .nays• Battle to be their

victory, as it was, but they felt it was such a great vic-

tory for them and a disasterous defeat for the English that
public

disaf~ection

in England would cause the King to bow

73Mary A. E. Green (ed.), Calendar

Domestic Series, of the reign
(tonaon, 1864), pp. xix-x.,~!v.

0£

State Pa~ers,

of Charles If, !665.!.i 66
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out·o£ the war.74 ·The initial news of the .four days'
fight in England was that the English had won a tremendous
victory.

As the days passed and reports continued to come

in, it became increasingly obvious that the battle was not
such a tremendous victory, and perhaps not a victory at
all, but the inability of the Dutch to follow up their
victory showed tha·t they had been hurt perhaps· as much as .

the English.75

It was certainly.not considered such a

serious def eat by the English as to discredit. the tactics
0£ the Duke of Albemarle and Prince Rupert.

After the

English Navy Board, led by the guiding spirits Penn, Coventry and Pepys, had worked miracles to get the fleet· back
to sea in early August of 1666 (at which feat the Dutch
were astonished), Rupert and Monck were still in command.76
In the last major battle of this war, the English fleet
once again caught the Dutch at a disadvantage.

The strong

wind or the day before and the shifting of the wind on the
day of the battle separated the Dutch fleet and gave the ·

weather gauge to the·· English. 77 , Even sot De Ruyter tried
to get his fleet in order and might have been able to put
up a much better fight than he did if not for Tromp, who
once again disobeyed the order of battle and went off
~~Colenbrander, I, p.
Wilson, p. lJ?. ·

368.
76Blok;·De Ruyter 1 p. 238.
77Ibid., P• 240.
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independently to attack a segmont or the English fleet.78
This action left De Ruyter's squadron to bear practically
the full weight

or

the English firo.

The Dutch were so

outnumbered and even the position of De Ruyter' s sh:i.p

looked so hopeless that the great admiral lost his

aom~

posure tor probably the first, last and only time in his
lite.

He cried, "Oh my Godl how wretched am I, that among

so many thousand balls not one will brine me death."

His

brother-in-law, Cornelia De Witt (the brother of John De
Witt, the Grand Pensionary) heard him and sugeested that
1£ his position was eo hopeless that he charge into the
midst of the English fleet and try to grapple the English
flagship as Opdam.had done in the Battle of Lowestoft.
Thia snapped De Ruyter out of' his depression and soon he .
was able to take his crippled fleet to safety in the
. shallow waters of home.79
After the Battle of the North r"oreland on August 4,

1666 (or as it is sometimes called, the St. James Day Fight
because on the old style calendar, the battle was fought on

July 25, St. James Day}, the English controlled the sea and
were.able to take advantage

or

t,his fact.

On August 8,

Sir Robert Holmes was ordered to attack the -islands
land and Ter Schelling.

~~Ibid., p. -247.

c.

M.

or

While doing this, Holmes discovered

Davies, Historz of Holland (London, 1854),

Vol. III, P• 51.

Vlie-
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a .fleet of one hundred fif'ty Dutch merchantmen waiting
for.an opportunity to make their. harbors and protected
by only two men-of-war.

The English attacked, easily ·

defeating the two warships· and then proceeded to dostroy ·
most of the merchantmen by

fireships~

Only a few or the

Dutch ships escaped by sailing up a nearby creek; this
was a tremendous.loss for the Dutch, estimated at one
million pounda.80

After destroying the Dutch merchant

fleet, the English landed a .force on Ter Schelling and
pillaged, plundered, looted and burnad.81
Almost before the English had had suf.fic1ent time· to

digest their victories a new·calamity struck.

On the night

of September 2, 1666, a fierce eastern wind in a very. ·dry

season caused a small fire·to spread uncontrollably through

London.

The niBht was light as day for ten milea aroundS2

and the fire acted rtas if it had a commission to devour.

everythi·p;g that was in its way". 83

The .fire lasted for two

daya84 and paralyzed the English war effort.

Later in September the English and Dutch fleets came
within'sight of each other off Boulougne, but both sides

80ogg, I, p. 303. An interesting thing about this
action was that the English were guided into the Vlie by
a Dutoh pilot, Lawrance Heemskerk, who had been banished
from his country. Davies, p. 54.
Blwiahan, p •. l.31.
.
. .
82E. s. De Beer (ed.), The Diary of John Evelyn (Ox~
ford, ~955), pp. 1.,50-.4?1•
8 Burnet,: p. J22.
. 84na Beer, p. 450.
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avoided a fight.

While tho shortages·

or

mon and supplies

on both sides was probably the main reason tha two navies
did not want to fight, an influential factor may have been,

as Charles Wilson .thinks, the apparent futility of fiBhting
without reaching a decision was·taking the heart out of

both commands.SS
Because of lack

or

money to cope with the·· continued

war, the Plague and.repairing the

e~tensive

damage of the

Great Fire, Charles embarked on a policy of economizing
in·the war effort.

The English great ships ware laid up

and the smaller ships of the English 'navy ware to concen..
trate their actions against Dutch trade rather than against
the Dutch navy.

On paper this plan looked pretty good;

commerce-destroying.· when successful, greatly embarrasses
the foreign government and distresses its people.

But to

be effective, there must be little or no.enemy navy caused
by the destruction

or that navy in battle or its being

overawed by a stronger naval force.86

In effect, Charles

!I's economizing act of laying up the battle fleet was an
attempt to enjoy a victory not yet secured.87

By Autumn

or

have bad results.

1666, Charles•s plan was beginning to
The Dutch took advantage- of the absence

of the English battle fleet to establish a limited blockade

8;
. '
.
Wilson, pp. 137-138.
86Mahan,·pp• 131•1.32.

,

8711iarcus , I, pp. 160-161.

·
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ot English ports, severely harassing the coal trade and
gravely endangering the vital supplies of masts and naval
stores from the Baltic.

By December, the arrival of four

mast-ships from New England was looked on by Pepys as tta ·
blessing mightily unexpected,· and without which, if for·
nothing else. we must have failed the next

year."sa

By May of 1667 both sides were so tired of the war

that they entered into peace

negotia~ions

at Breda.

Because the negotiations dragged along, with neither side
making any substantial concessions, De Witt decided to
carry out a project he had been planning for a long time,
a sortie up the Thames by the Dutch fleet.89
Early in June, 1667. a small Dutch force under Van
Ghent tried to sail up the river running through Edinburgh,
but was forced back out to sea.

Rumors spread.immediately

that the Dutch had been.practicing to sail up the Thames,

and measures were put into effect to protect the river,
but a few days passed; the rumors died down and the work
fell ott.90 On the 14th of June, 1667t a fleet of between
sixty and seventy Dutch men-or-war left the Texel under the

command of Michael De· Ruyter and Cornelis De Witt.

They

88Ibid.,, I, p. 160. Charles's handling of the last
phase of tlie war was so distasteful to Pepys and Coventry
that they tried to wash their hands or all responsibility·
for this new policy. Wilson! p. 139~ ·
B9f1t!arcus, I, pp. 160-16 • ·.

90Blok,.Nethcrlanda, IV, P• 329.
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reached the mouth of the Thames on June 19 and decided
to try·to force their way into the Medway on the twentysecond.91

It was well.evident from the very beginning

that this expedition had been well-timed and

well-planned~

Soundings of the Thames Estuary had been made; Van Ghent's
movement, towards Edinbureh had proved to be a feint and
the whole enterprise was timed so that advantage could be
taken of the spring tide.92

A large measure of responsibility . .for the success of
the Dutch adventure must go to the English for the almost
unbelievable mismanagement.and disorganization with which
t.hey handled the affair.

The hastily erected shore batteries·

failed, not just because they were manned by hastily recruited volunteers, but because the oak planks that should
have been available in more than adequate quantities had
been atolen and/or embezzled.

As a result the heavy cannons

of the shore batteries had to be mounted on very thin boards
(called deal) and every time the guns tired tho wheels broke
through the planks and sank into the ground.93

Another

example of the poor planning that the English used in their
hasty·def'ence·was that, in their hurry to sink ships to
91Edmundson, P• 21J.3.

92ogg, I, pp. 309-310. The Dutch were advised in their
attack up the Thames by Samuel Ravens, an assistant mastershipwright to O!lristopher Patt, who left England at the time
of' th9 Restoration. Tanner, Pepys' Naval ?~~.. nutes. 1 pp. 46-47.
3Ogg, I, p. 311.
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block the channel, they sank a brand new ship and another
ship loaded with valuable supplies for the fleet•94
The Dutch surprise attack was a complete success.;.

They broke through the chain across the Medway and the line

of sunken ships and captured the flagship of the English
fleet, the R·oyal Charles, at Chatham•

Then, along with a

-couple of other prizes, the Dutch retreated back out to

sea.95
The Dutch attack on Chatham must be accounted one of the most brilliant. audacious, and completely successful strokes

in the annals of naval warfare.

From

start to finish the operation was con·ducted with consummate skill. The navigation of ·the Thames estuary by so ·large
a fleet, and still more, the orderly retrea·~

down the Medway, spoke volumes

for the fine

seaman~gip

officers and craws."1 · ·

of the Dutch
.
·

Even Pepys, who was no admirer of the Dutch, gave them their
due: "Thus, in all things, in wisdom, courage, force, :15-1owledge

of our own streams, and success, the Dutch have the beat ot us,
and do end the war vdth victory on their side. "97

Before discussing the Treaty 0£ Breda, there ia. one ~,se
of the war t,he.t should be discussed•

Though he showed little

inclination to help the Dutch, Louis XIV took advantage.of
. his alliance with them to advance into the West Indies·.

914-H. B. Wheatly· {ed.}, ~he Diar:t;. of Samuel Pe:exs ( l~ew
York• 1946), Vol.- II, p. 554•
9 5Blok 1 Ifotherlands • IV, pp. 336·.337.
96Marcus, t, t>• 16!.-

97Ibid., P•

102~
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French forces captured St. Kitts in April of 1666, Antigua
in November and' Monserrat in February 0£ 1667, but in
April of 1667, Sir John Harmon arrived in the a:rea in com-

mand of: a strong English naval force.

Charles II may have

been economizing in home waters. but the French danger tq
English possessions in the Carribbean was too great for
him to ignore.

On May 20, 1667, Harman's .fleet defeated

a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet off Montserrat and the next
month the French fleet was dec.isively defeated off Marti--

nique, ending the French threat and saving the English
West Indies.9 8
After the.trip up the Thames, the Dutch controlled
the seas as the English fleet had done in 1654.

In July

of 1667, both sides finally reached an agreement and the_

Treaty of Breda was signed.

Contraband was restricted to

munitions 0£ war, visit and search were lightened, the
principle of n.rree ship,. free goods"
the Navigation Act

or

acknowledged and

1660 was modified so that the Dutch

could import into England commodities
duction or manutacture

~aa

or

or

the growth, pro•

the German hinterland of' Holland.

England k~pt Deleware,, New Jersey and New York99 and the

Dutch kept Surinam, which they had captured from the English in March of 1667.100

98ogg, I, p. 307.
9· 9W11son, PP• 141-142.
1 0OOEdmundaon, P• 243.

8.3
Called by Wilson "an act of moderation.and good sensen~lOl
the Treaty of Breda marked a turning-point in Anglo•Dutoh
relations.

"The most acute phase

rivalry was now over.

of colonial and economic

In the West Indies and West Africa the

main problems were settled; elsewhere they were well on the
way to settlement.

The ensuing period laid the foundations

_,

ot a community of interest which ultimately found expression

in alliance."

Although this treaty helped, it was not the

.final answer.

"The Breda

keep

ou~

treaty.h~lp~d

the two peoples to

of each other's way; ·but if other circumstances

had set.them on opposite sides

or

European quarrels more

lastingly than they did in the war or ·1672-4, their econo~ic

rivalry, instead of fading away, might have been fought

o~t to a finish.nl02

10lw11aon, p. 142.
102c1ark, pp. 66·67.

Chapter Ill
The Third Anglo-Dutth WRr

The third war between England

~nd

Holland in less than a

quarter ot a eentury was unlike the firet two mainly because it
was not primarily a result

o~

eommereial jealousy between Eng-

land and the Netherlands.

The major responsibility tor getting

England involved in this attempt by Louie XIV to crush and/or
absorb the Duteh goes to Charles II, who was believing more and
more that the United Provinces were the permanent and unalterable
enemies ot England.l . ~hile there was some support among the
great and rising mereantile oommunity as well as Charles II'a
courts for another round with the Dutch and while the English
were yearning to revenge the humiliating· deteat ot the Medway,2
the,hatred ot the Dutoh by the English had. generally abated, so
much so that an allianoe with the Dutch was popular With the

p.

a1auriee Lee, Jr.• The Cabal (Urbana, Illinois, 1965),

ao,.

"Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 74.

people.•

3

"In the third quarter of the seventeenth eentury English
tor~ign

policy was moving toward one of those massive eha:nges
'

of direction which oocur at long intervals in the international
relations

or

major

states.~"

4

The last change had been a elear

identification of Spain as the major· enemy during the middle
of the sixteenth century. with the Freneh and Duteh
!rienda~

~s

potential

While the power structure in Europe had substantially

altered since Elizabethan times. the Policy makers

.

lish government had been ve-ry slow to see.this.

5

of

the Eng•

Most of Ch;\rles•s

ad'Viaors favored a French alliance, but after the elose of the
second Dutoh W«r L.ord Arlington had gained the ear

or ·the

King

anti had persuaded him that an alliance With. the Dutch wae in ·
.

England's beet interest.

.

.

.

.

.

Aa a resultl the 'l'riJij Alliance was

.

'

formed between England~. Holland,and Sweden on January 13 1 1668.

6

'ro Charles the alliance With Holland did not in any ·way

impair his relations with France~ but eened as a demonstration

to Louis XIV that alliance With England was valuable and should
be bought at a decent priee·..

Charles knew that only b1y an alli.:_.,

a.nee with Franee eould success in foreign policy be attained
cheaply..

From the seeond Dutch war, Charles had learned that

England alone could not defeat the Dutch·,:· but he tel t that Eng•
3
l#1aurice Lee, Jr., The_ Cabal (Urbana, Illinois, 1965),p.

4

Ibid.-, p.

5

.

79.

Ibid.

6-·

Ibid. pp. 92 • 93•
-.

91+•
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land and France together could easily do so.
victory

o~er

An easy, quick

the Duteh would reeoneile the English public to

the French alliance, which he knew would be unpopular in the
beginning.

By enormously expanding

trade 1 the:Duteh

Engl:i~h

defeat would swell the King's revenues so greatly that his
.financial problems would be solved and he 1

Charle~

II,. would

be well7 on ·the road toward independence of Parliament.·tbe
Stuart
.
•
dream.
For this reason Charles entered into the seeret treaty of
Dover with Louis XIV in 1670,
Ca.tholic and to

suppo~

with the English Navy.

a French

himself·~ a

war~against

the United Provinces

In return, Louis was to supply Charles

· ttdth money to fight the war.
never declare

Charles -was to deelare himaelf a

Both sides knew that Charles would

Catholic and· each knew that the other

knew• but they wenu·ahead and decided on the spring of 1672 as
the date. to estart the war.

Charles knew that the English people

would never stand tor his deolar1ng himself a Catholic or aeeepting money from a foreign power, so the public Treaty of Dover,

eigned in Deeember ot 1670, made no mention of these conditions
and waa only an alliance between Eng1and and France.

a

Now all Charles had to do waa to find the mone1 to prepare
for and .fight the war.

In 1671 1 the King's finaneial' situation·

Ibid., PP• 96 - 97.

g

Ib~~it

PP• 112 • ll).

was as grim as it had been in 1667.

Government revenue ·was

pledged a year to eighteen months in advance

~o

repay loans

already contracted; the French subsidy was inadequate and when
Charles asked for eight hundred thousand pounds for the· navy in:.

October of 1670 1 Parliament gave him slightly more than three
hundred thousand.

To provide money for

poned the paymente

outst~nding

~he

war, Charles post-

until a later date to liberate

the government revenue for the expenses of war.

It is easy to

see from this that Charles was betting all he had on a short,
quick and decisive victory, a·war that would not last more than
9
siX months.
In January of 1672 England sent the United Provinces an
ultimatum summoning them to acknowledge the right of the Englieh
crown to the sovereignity of the British seas.
'

.

The Dutch finally

'

saw that the increasingly belligerent acts of England were being
backed by France and could ·no longer be

appease~

by

concessions~

In February ot 1672, the Dutch ordered seventy-five ships of the
line into commission.

Ori ~'larch 23 1 1672 1 ·the English attacked

the Dutch Smyrna tleet

or

war.

merohantmen·L.without a declaration of

While this attempt to seeure rieh booty from the enemy

immediately failed, ~t was too late to ttirn back.

On the twenty-

ninth of that month, England declared war on Holland, ostensibly .
beeau$e of Dutch failure to salute the English flag, and France

9
Ibid. 1 PP• 144 •· 152.

88
followed suit on April 6,. 1672·,

10

'l'he most important way in which the last. of the Anglo-Dutch

Wars differed .from the first two was that in this war England
was.not Holland's chief opponent Qnd £or that reason the naval
operations were not the main part of the war.
the war was a.

sem1-div1n~·

ll

To Louis XIV

punishment 0£ a recalcitrant race; to

Charles the war was a personal bargain With some advantage to·
his :subjects; but to the Dutch thew ar was a time

or

disaster,

. .
12
revolution and heroic struggle tor national existence.

.·

The main feature of the seR. war was that, except for the
opening ba,tle, the Dutch did not send their fleet out to meet
the enemy, but fought a

de.fen~Jive-offeneive

-war,, hiding in the

shoals and only attacking when it was to their advantage to do
so.

13

Another characteristic of this war ie that the Englieh and

·French toeether were.tar too strong for the Dutch to try anything
in the Mediterranean Sea.

14

The initial plan ot the English and French wae to proceed
to the North Sea and

~hor

the homecoming Dutch trade.

near the Dogger Bank in the path

or

This would force the Dutch to come

well out to eea where it could be brought to decisive action on

15

English and French terms.

.
While the· French Navy lacked tast

10
Matha•, p. 143.
11

12

.

Clark, P• 74.

13

Ogg I, P• .357.

Mahan, P• 14.4.
14
Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 75,
15
Marcus. I, p. 16.5.

frigates and their,smaller ships were unfit for North Sea
storms, the addition of this force to the English Navy brought

total strength to ninety-eight warships of six
and thirty-four thousand men.

only

s~\Tenty-five

In

comp~rison,

thous~nd

guns

the Dutch had

warships with .four thous:;;.nd ·.ri,ve hundred

'

' 16

guns and twenty thousand men.'

The Dutch republic was not as well

it should have been.

pr~pared

for w;i.:r aa

DeWitt•s policy ot sttengthening the

navy at the expense of the arr11y because of the fear of the

military power of the Orange family

in very poor shape.

h~d

le!t the Dutch army

Also, De Witt had convinced himself that

the \G.r would be •gainst France alone and, beeauee the Dutch'
Navy wa.s 'more than a match for the French NQvy alone, the Dutch
Navy had been somewhat neglected.

However, when it became obvi-

ous in March that England was to be in this war, efforts were
started to bring the strength

or

the Dutch Navy up to one hundred

twenty ships with thirty thousand men.

17

-~.

The first Dutch plan was to strike the French fleet in their
home waters before they had time to join the English, but De Witt
18
was unable to get the navy ready in time to do this. 'The next
plan wae to strike the gnglish fleet in the Thaines, before the

French fleet eould arrive from Brest.

lb

Ogg, I, P•

J;a.

17
.
Blok, Netherlancls, p. 371.
18
Pontalis, II, P• 248.

The Dutch Navy under De

90
Ruyter was physically e.apable of achieving this objeetive, but
was suffering at that moment from a.

c~se

of acute decentralization

of the naval administration and the project was never put into
effect.

19

When in June 1 De Ruyter•s fleet was finally able to put to

sea, his plan was to meet the. combined Anglo-French fleet and
He met the enemy and fell back toward his

bring it to battle.

own coast, expecting, to fight on his own terms.

Ap~rently

the·

Duke of York, who vm.s in eomrntil.nd of the combined fleet, (Monak

died in January ot 1670) thought the French weren't retidy and
decided to go home;

50

he ordered the Anglo-French fleet to

retire to Southwold Bay (also known

~s

Sol.e Bay).

De Ruyter .

turned and .followed them a.nd decided to fight them on the seventh
20
ot June• 1672.
·The Dutch .fleet came up ao quickly on the allies that drums

were beaten to give notice to all seamen to retire immediately
to their ships a.nd bailiff's were sent to throw all sailors out
21
of the ale houses.
The French were in.the van to the south and
the English wero in the center and rear.

lhe wind was bltYwi.ng

towards the coast, which at this poin·t ran nearly no_rth and south•

giving the Dutch the weather gage.

The Dutch advanced

$0

rapidly

that they eaught the French and English in an awkward position;
the allies had first to cut their cables and get under way and

19

Jt:al~an,

p. 145.

20·

21

Ibid., pp. 145 -14~

Mary A. E. Green, Calendar of State PaRers, Domestic Series
~ Charles ll. 1622 (London, 1864) p. 83.

2!. !t!!. Reign

91
they were not able to fall back to gain time or room to set up
their battle line.

For some unknown reason, the English headed

north-northeast on a eourse which .forced them soon to turn about
and the French went down the coast in the opposite direction in
order to get out to sea.

This serious split in the allied fleet

at the very beginning of the battle put the Dutch in a tremendoue
position..

De Ruyter sent one division to hold the French while
22

he fell on ··the two English divisions with superior numbers.,

Teehnieally the battle was indeeisive, both sides losing
heavily, but aetu•lly the substantial advantages were all With
the Dutch.

They had attacked a superior

for~e

in its home waters

and took advantage 0£ a weakness which wa3 in part due to their

rapid advance.

Bec,use they were able to check the Franch while

they £ought the English, they upset the allied plans ot a Freneh

.

.

land .invasion supported by naval action by about a n1onth.

23

For a while it seemed:as it the French Army needed no assistance of any sort.

The :h"rench Army invaded the United Provinces
I

early in ilay and, following the Policy of bypassing the smaller
occupied towns, within a month had carried all before them.

24'

I~

seemed in June as if ,the Dutch had lo$t; three provinces had been
overrun, Utrecht was in,danger o! falling and the Dutch had only
nine thousand znen to stop the . one hundred twenty thousand of Turenne

22

N~han, p. 146.
23
1J2!.<i. t P.• 11.,,7 - 148.
24

I~id.,

p. 149.
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and Conde.

lhe

25

r~pid

French •dv.Rnce caused strong public .feelin' ag.ninst

26

John 9'.nd Gornelis De Witt,, despite De Ruyter•s

m~v-.l vic~ory,.

.

Rlther than allow the house of Orange to.come to power, De.Kitt
offered to capitul.ate to Louie's peace demands, but the J3'rench

de~

m;ands were too severe for even De Witt, as hard pressed as he was,
to ascept.

While De

Witt~

was negotiating ·\\11th the Prenoh• the Dutch
1

resistanoe began to crystallize wlth the opening
Amsterdam on June 24, 1672.

or

the dikes by

1ne other cities of the Netherlands

followed her example and opened their dikes •nd on July 81 William
of

Or~nge

was made Stadtholder and comF£nder of the •rmy •nd navy.

What De Witt had tried to prevent all his life ·- the revival of
the House ot Orange -- had oeeurred beo•use Louis XIV was too greedy

and would not tone down his demands.

A few weeks later the tr;.ns.;,

formation of Holland from a. republic to a limited monarahy was
. 27
complete with the murder o:f the two De Witts by an angry mob.
lne first t&sk of the new government was to form an army.
The Dutch Navy

wne;

no·t needed tor

~

while .ttfter the victory e..t

Sole Bay, but the Dutch Army neaded men• so one-third- of the ;ships

were unrigged to free their sailors and marines for the new Dutch

2a

Army,

25

26

The Dutch even secured an alliance with Spain which netted

Baxter• P• · 70 •

Edmundson, P• 253.
27
l•lahan, pp. l/4-9 -. 150.
28
.
Blok, Netherlands, P• 379.
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them some Spanish regiments
Stadtholder

w.i.S

29

•nd by the autumn of 1672 1 the

in coro.rJartd of an army

or

fi!ty-seven thousand·

men, with whieh he 3Uirted his upward climb against the French-

30

In one of the firs·t acts after he begame: ~Stadtholder,

Willi•rn showed th'1t he was a Wi.ae and capable leader by keeping
De Ruyter in co1nn1•nci of the Dutch Navy, although he had been a

.friend of John De Witt Qnd was Cornelis·De Witt's brother-inlaw. In fact, be increased De Ruy·ter's oommand·by making him
Lieutenant-AdFJiral of the Provinae3 with aln1ost unlimited in•

structions.

William allowed himself to be wholly guiae·d by

De Ruyter in naval affairs· and the only :tavor that he asked of ·

De Ruyter was that he allow l'romp to be reinstated into the
fleet, which De Ruyter did.

31

ln June of 167.3, the Anglo-Prenc:h fleet, under the command
of Prince Rupert ('lhe Duke of York bad been foreed to retire

'

from public office in June of 167) by the Test Aet

32

)was eruis•

ing along the, southern Dutch eo-.st, hoping th-.t De Ruyter' s flee'IJ
would come out from behind the shoals

·~

fight.

The Dutch were

Been riding Within the sands of Schoneveldt and a detached asuad-

ron t1'e sent to

draw,the~

out.

vitation, for the wind was in

29

De Ruyter, however, needed no in•
hi~

favor, giving him the.advantage

Baxter, p. 70.

30

. . Edmundson, p. 258.

31

.
Davies. PP• 127-128. '11romp ha.d been deprived from naval

oonutiand at De Ruyter' s request after his independent action and
disobedienee of orders ~everely hurt the Dutch in the battle of
the North Foreland. Edmundson, P• 241.

32

Ogg, I, P• 3?0.
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of the weather gage.

He .used his advantage well and came out

·33

so quickly th«.t the t.t.llied line was hit before it was formed,.

1bis hit....and..run .aetion of De Huyter was indecisive, but
a week later in the second battle of the 3choneveldt• De l?uyte:r:·

attacked again when it ma to his advantage to do :so.

In

ano·ther indeeisive action he hurt the. Anglo-French fleet

~dly

enough to foree it to return to the English coast to refit and

take on new supplies.

In both battles the Dutch and English had

only a little over fifty ships o! the line
34
a little,less than thirty.

~nd

the French had

Prince Rupert's failure to bring De Ruyter to deeieive
aetion in the campaign

or

1673 was due in part to the !•ct· that

the, government could not.adequately man, provision and equip
the flee:t or even maintain a sufficient reserve of stores for

.. 35

refitting and repairs.

Obviouely Charles's gamble or1

~.

six

3

~.i*.han, pp~ 151 - 152.
34
Ibid., p. 152.

35

l·l:iilreus, I. p .• 16?.. In faet, as a result of this, the
Dutch fleet had got·ten to sea be·tore the English and in early
May tried to block the narrow Sw:tn channel of the Trutmes estu...
ary With sunken hulks filled with rocks. It it had worked, a

eonsiderable part of the English .fleet would 11:4ve been immobilized, but at the last minute a dense tog foreed the Dutch to
sail slowly as they were escorting the sinkers into pl«ee, allow-.
ing the English to be warned in time. · Then Rupert, in a daring
teat of seam~nship, sailed through the tog and the shoals and
took the Dutch force by surprise, forcing them to abandon the
sinkers and return to Holland. Ibid.
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month

W&l.r

had not paid otf.

The initial enthusiasm !or the

war rapidly faded aw:.y as the w.ar

d~a.gged

on, and the

rel~e-·

tance of the Freneh to fight greatly inere•sed their unpopu.36
larity in Engl.and.
In August, the Anglo-French forces appeared off the
northern Dut;ch coast, ·with the intention of landing troops,

but De Ruyter stayed in the shallow w.aters along the oo-.st,
biding his time.

During the

ni~ht

of the twentieth, the

wind shifted so that it was to De Ruyter's advanUige.

With

Q.bout seventy ships he c•1rne out to fight sixty English

~nd

thirty French ships.

Once ag6l,in 1 De Ruyter' s strategy w:ts

to hold t.he French in check while they fought the English on

equal terns.

37

~~rtel,

French fleet,

the French admiral cornmanding the van of the
W'tS

ordered to stretch ahead• go about

~md

gQin

to windward of the Dutch van, in order to catch the Dutch in
a cr·ossfire, but the Dutch Adn1ir::1.l, &nkert (who had lost a

leg in the battle of Lowestoft} sa.w the danger and
the remaining French ships with his twelve.

r~n

through

B&Lnkert then stood

down to join De Ruyter, who had been. driftit1g out to sea with ,

Rupert.

This

~;as

a, deliberute act on the part

)6

ru.g_. J P•

172.,

37
Mahan, p. 152.

or

the Prince,

desiened to draw the DUtch away from their coast so that it
the wind shifted the Dutch would be unable to return to the
prot;ection of their shallow waters. D•Estrees .•. the commander

of

Freneh fleet, claimed that this seperation of. the center

th~

from the van prevented his aiding the English; however Banker•
was

~oming

from the

s~me

JS

direction and was able ·to join De Ruyter.·

The main fighting of the· battle of the Texel was in the
eenter between the Dutch and English where two duels were t@.king
place.

11he .fighting betwEH"'n Sir Edw.ard Spragge and 1"romp 'Was

so fierce.that both

•dmir~ls

had to cru:tnge ships three times;

and on the third change of flag, Spr:tl.gge was killed.

Rupert

was so ha.rd<Mlpreaaed by Bankert and De Ruyter that he w.as .firing

broadeides to Windward &nd leeward.

He managed; however, to

edge over to his rear...admiral to gather his forces for one last
tight ..

39

In the words ot Pr-lnce Rupert, "If the Freneh,then lying
within distance to windwards had obeyed my signall, and borne

downe upon the enemy aeeording _to their duty, I must have
routed and torne them all to pieees.

greatest opportunity ever

It was the plain !3t and
.
40
lost at sea."
1

As a result of the Battle of the Texel (or as the Dutch

.

c~lled

it, the Battle of Kijkduin) 1

)8-
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40
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41

.

~nother indeeisiv~

aetion,

.97
the Dutch harbors were cleared for returning merchantmen
42
and the possibility of an enemy landing ~•s eliminated.
An even more important result of this battle was that it

tanned the !lames

or

distrust

or

the English for the J;'reneh.

The English people were much more-appreciative ot a determined
.
43
enemy than they were ot a fiokle ally.
A captured Dutch
seamen said o:t the French unwillingness to aid the English
that the French "have hired the English to fight for them
and all their business here is to see that they earn their
wages."

44

An English evaluation of the value

is given in

th~jseontemporary

or

the alliance

letter:

•• •tor -they are here not a little perplexed 1
as well by reason of the .want of money, as
naval ammunition; to which adde the daily .
jealousy against the French, which

g:r~ving

the King must dissemble against his Will,
being obliged to say agains·t his better knowledge, and·to still the report, that the
French had tought well, apprhehending that
it he should owne the truth, he would be reproached by the whol~ nation. for having too
hastily engaged himself 'td th the .French, who
see nothing .else th~n by corruption and .fraud
to g$t the nior.tarahy _or all Europe. For, since
tlle late fight it hath been said plainly
enough, that the French D~SSEIN appears, and
the English, among other kindnesses, hs.ve
shewed them not only the manner and order ot
fighting at sea, ·without endangering them, but
taught them also the toasts, sands, banks,

advenues 1 ~nd in ~hort, LE POR'l'E ET LE FOIBLE
of this kingdome,45
,
. .

42
Ibid.
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0gg, I, p. 376.

/}4

Mahan, p. 155.c

45

Oolenbrander, II, p. 126.

The growing resentment against the French, the improbability

. ot ever fighting a conclusive action against the Dutch :itnd the
tremendous lack of money wi'tb.Whieh to continue the war eaused
an a.nti-·war feeling in England which Chii.rles II could not ig•
On February 19, 1674; despite the rrreaty of Dover, Eng..

nore,.

land signed a seperate peace 'With the Dutch.

Louis XIV wanted

to sign a peaee treaty with the Dutch while he still had control
over large amounts or Dutch territory, but the Dutch had the
upper hand now and fought on until 16?6.

By that time Louis

XIV was fighting the House of Hapsburg in Spain and Germany

and had to pull his troops out of Holland.

46

'!be treaty·or Westminster was another act of model'iiltion
and good sense.

The honor of the flag was again ceded to

England and British.waters were de.tined ae etretehing· from
Cape Finisterre to Van Staten in N0 rway.

The Dutch allowed

'the English colonists to leave Suriruun With their slaves and

possessions

~nd

during the war.

returned New York, which they had captured

While nothing was said about the position of

the Prince of Orange or of herring fishing in British

waters,

the Dutch paid the English an indemnity ot nearly two hundred
47
thousand pounds.
The two most

D-.Jteh

~iars

impor~nt

changes that -oceurred during the

were the rapid advances made in naval technology

and m.v&t.1 tactics And the tremendous losses the Dutch suf.tered
.
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in terms of their merehant fleets, their tradej their eredit
and their economy.

l'he most Siinifieant change in naval tech-

nology was the greatly increased size Q.nd firepower
l~rge

ships.

or

the

1'he big ships of the first Du.teh war were the

medium-sized ships of the second and third wars.
However• one must remember that, in the words ot Sir

Anthony Deane, the great seventeenth century English shipbuilder:

••• no one shape of a ship can .be in general
said to be the best; for every distinct use
requires a different shape, and the skill lies
only in building best for the p.rticular use
designed• whieh differs as your purposes for
this or that depth 0£ water• for speed, for
strength, £or weight ot guns, fo~ number ot
men, for calm or rough seas, tor short or
long voyages, for storage of goods~ and many
other circumstances, as fewnet;;~ of hands to
sail with.; bearing sail, ete.4
While the English had the bigger ships and the, bigger guns

a~

the start of the -wars, they too bef\e!ited .from the advances

in naval teehnology.

The English benefited from both the

French and the Dutch designs.

In the second Duteh war, the

English noticed that the lower tier of guns on Dutch ships
was tour feet rrom the water 4nd that the Dutch ships could

store provisions

to~

.four months while the lower deck guns in

English ships were three feet from the water and English ships
earried provisions for only ten weeks.

Led by Sir Anthony

Deane, English shipwrights copied the Dutch and came out with

48

•

T.anner,

PepI~t

•

J

Naval Minutes, p. 37.
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the Warspite •nd the Defianee Which c"'-rried their lower tier
0£

guns four and a half feet tron the water and could store

provisions for six months.

In the third Dutch

v.-.r,

the English

noticed th-.t the French ships were wider in the be;ua, making them

more battle-worthy, which design the English then copied.
The

s~tement

49

hRa often been made that the English ships

were more heavily armed than the Duteh, but just how great a
The armament or the Royal Prinee 1 a

difference w.ts there?

first elass ship taken by the Dutch in the Four Days' Ba-tJtle
of the second Duteh war,. was fourteen guns firing shells weigh-

ing

forty~eight

pounds, fourteen thirty-two pounders,,thiriy

'twenty-..four pounders, sixteen twelve pounders and rourteen·s1x
50
pounders.
While for the most part the heaviest eannon on a
Dutch ship fired • twenty•four pound cannon ball, there is
record of

~

few thirty-six pounders, but no mention of any

forty-eight pounders.

51

between the sizes of the
· aa great

~s

This apparently tremendous disparity

eune

it seems, however.

carried by both fleets is not
The English tactics o:t firing

a.t the enemy hulls, to be effective, would call ror heavy guns,
while the Dutch would not i1eed more tha11 a twenty-four pounder

to carry out their tactics of f'iri11g at .the enemy's masts and

rigging.

49
P• 239.

·w.

50

Another point to consider ia the r-.at that the more

Laird Clowes, The Roral N•VI;

i Historz.·

(London, lS97)

Ibid., . P• 27 /H
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water it would draw, negating its &dvant;.ge

retreat to safety in the shallow

w~ter

or

being able to

of its eoastline. Also,

there is evidence that the Duteh invented chai11 shot, the first
recorded uae of which: ie in ·the Four Days' Battle.
we~pon

52

This new

grea.tly increased the effectiveness of the Dutch battle

tactics and lessened the need for heavy guns on Dutch ships.
Mlile there
firing p,ower of

w~s

a tremendous increa5e in the eize and

i~nglish

-nd Dutch. ships between the ·first and

second Dutch lr.trs, the increase was not
second a.nd third l'tar:s.

~s

great between th•

In the second Dutch 't"mr, the heavieai

English snips carried between ninety .and one hundred guns and
this wa5 increased.only slightly in the third

~~r.

For this

war, the English had three £irst-n.te ships, .the Sovereign,

the Prince; and the Charles, mounting one hundred ten guns,
earrying crews of almost eight hundred men.and havlng :a tonnage
53
of t~o thous~nd or more.
'l'he English even had one 5hip, the
54
Prince Royal, carrying one hundred twenty guns ..
Because 01: tha shallovmess of their t\ra ters, the Dutch

could not build much bigger ships than they built in the setond
Dutch war.

55

Although the Dutch ships

or

the second war were

bigger and 5tronger than those of. the tirst, because of greater
52

Burnet, p. ;21. De Witt was

ventor. Ibid.

cortt~only
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. Ogg, p. 265.
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and thicker timbers being used, making the ships wider Qnd
giving the guns and crew more ro01u.

56
'l'hsre w.as not that ,much

difference between the Dutch ships of the second and third wars-.
As an example, De Ruyter's

t'l~gehip,

the Seven Provinces, earry-

ing four hundred seventy-five men and eighty guns, was brand
new in 1665 and was the sarne ship De Ruyter used through.out the

third war,;

57

De Ruyter' s ila1;ship •lso serves to illustrate

another point, the .fa.ct that the Dutch ship5 of the 5econd and
,third Dutch wars were much etronger and more -.ble to \'Ji thstand
58

heavy .fire than those of the first war.

De Ruyter's flagship

in the thick o! the fighting throughout ·the second and third

wa3
Weirs

and survived every battle.
, In navQl taeties there was not rts r*lpid progress throughout

~he

wars .as there had been in

n~v~l

·technology.

The most import-

ant improvement was the line-of-batt,le .formo.tion., whieh evolved
during the first war.

Until the Dut.oh r'1et their equals at sea

in the form of the English• the necessity of war did not force
eailing; fleets to sail in line.

Since the di5'1.ppearana€! or the

galley, almost all the guns on a ship of W».r w®re found on the
aides• t\;_'\;\S the
tol~.rds

turned

be~m,

or side of a. ship• should at all time:s be

the enemy.

Another adv;.ntage :or the line ·was that

.

the enemy eould beat be kept in siEhL by a line ahead formation.

The fighting instruations issued by the Duke of York were
·5

Colenbrander, I, p. 172.

57
58Blok, llil nuyter, pp. 216 - 223.
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Edmundson, P• .240.

Mahan, pp. 115 - 116.
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,based on those of 1654, but a distinction was introduced between
defense against an attack from

wind~~rd

and against that from lee-

ward and an .attempt wa.s n1ade to aehieve greater mobility.

One must

remember• however, tha't the :scien,ti.fic elen1ent in maritime tactics

in the seventeenth aentury was very small; the se-vere deficits ot
the square-rigged ship limited the primary objective of a fleet to
sinking or capturing the enemy, by gun-fire, fire ships, boarding

or foreing the enemy on the shoals.

The primary prerequisite for

attaining theee objectives was to obtain the weather-gauge, that

ia 1 to get to windw..rd of the enemy and retain this
age throughout.

tae~ieal

advant-

The advantages 0£ this position were that the .fleet

with it had the initiative, since it could down on the wind and
attack or hold baek if it were not ·co its advantage to attack.

Anot,her

~dva.nt.. ge ~s

·that gwmers on the \dnc,Wit,rd ships had an

unimpeded view of the enemy, beeause the smoke was being
away.

blol~

Also, £ireships, tb.e most. dreaded engines· of naval -warfare.

could be drifted downwind towards ·t;he enemy,.,

ot the weather gauge

w~s

that, in a stiff

T'he one disadvantage

br~eze,

the lower tier ot

guns on the leeward side were likely to be under water and thus
60
eould not be brought, into action.
'fne gaining of the weather-gauge was like irdnning the toss

of the coin in a football game but, a.tter this Winning of tl1e
initial advantage wasi iobtained, there was no clearly defined
principle to follow.

In the last two Dutah

~"ars.

the general

practice was for ·the two £leet,s to file past eaoll other, firing

65

Ogg, I, P• 266.
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at the enemy's hulls and rigging.

lnen the ships in the lead

(the van) bore round to take up position behind the rear.most
ships in order to repeat the

att~ck.

When the order of b.ittle

melee

was broken. there was usually a general

in which the dis-

abled ships might be burnt by fireships or boarded.
were better disciplined thiAn the DutGh

bee~use

I'he English

they did not have

roving free-lances like the younger 'rrom1). nor were their fleets

divided into Orange and De Witt factions.
uiahing

ch~r,;.eteristic

they kept their line.

61

But the

~ain

disting•

of the Eni:J.ish was the preeisio11 with which

In ·t.he words of .a French1na11 v.iho i.d tnessed

the Four Days' 11-.ttle {a Dutch viotor·y):

Nothing equ;;.la the-beautiful order of the En~lish
at sea. Never was a line drawn straighter than
that forme<l by their ships; thus they bring; all
their fire to bear upon those who draw near them
•• •.'.I.hey fight like a. line of cava.lry which is
handled according to rule, and applies itself
aolely to foree ba~k those who oppose; whereas
the Dutch advance like cavalry 'Whose squadrons
leave t,geir ranks and cmne seper•toly to the
charge •. 2

Another characteristic of the English Navy

w~s

their great faith

in their gunners, causing them to place less reliance on boarding
thQ.n did other navies (notably the French).

'nle bulk

ot the

great Dutch hulls, plus the proportion of unseasoned wood in
the hulls, caused

th~

English to aim at the Dutch hulls, while

the E~glish present~d a smaller rreeboard. (the distance between
the waterline and the deck) strongly influencing the Dutch to
63
.
.
aim at their masts and rigging.
·
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Ibid., I, P• 267.
62:Ma.han, p., 126.
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Ogg, I, P• 267.
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The most important occurrence during' these twenty-two
years of intermi tteigtt\fr.4?"'f.are

\~Ct.s

the

creation of two well-nigh

invincible navies, each with its o\m -.dvantages and differences.,

knocking heads Viciously three times in less than a quarter of
a century, but

e~.ch

navy unable to fatally hurt the other..

It

is unusual in history tor two such powerful navies to develop
side by side, and the disappearance of one navy would naturally
leave the other supreme on the seas.
years

or

In the remaining two

the Franco-Dutch land struggle, the Dutch fought a

war of reconquering lost territory.

The erain on the limited

Duteh resources overtaxed Duteh strength, forcing Holland to
sacrifice her navy in order to maintain a large standing army
with which to fight

Franc~.

64

;

In the first war there was a great controversy as to
whether the Dutch Navy should be used primarily to convoy the
Dutch merchant ships or to attack and try to destroy the English
Navy, but this was no longer an issue by the second and third
wars.

In the first war the ruling oligarchy of Holland was so

worried about losing money in a war with England that they ser.. ~~

iously hanpered the Dutch war effort by assigning it to convoy
By the time of the second war, the Dutch had profited by

duty.

their mistakes.

They had seen that major conflicts ·with the Eng-

lish Navy would force it back to its home base to refit and the
Duteh could then sneak in convoys of merchantmen with only ligh'
escorts needed to drive away English privateers and commeree4

..

f!ilrcus, I, p. 174.
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raiders.

Thus, the main duty of the Dutch

N~vy

in the second

wa.r was to a. ttack the enemy fleet, and the protee·tion of merl~S

chant convoys

65

only a minor duty.

In the ·third Dutjoh war 1

the main duty of the Dutch fleet was to pr"vent «. landing by
the Anglo-French forces and, if possible, "to
in ha.tt>le ·to

s~nd

for eo11voy duty,

66

d~nage

them enough

them home for a while.. No ships were dispatched
le~ving

tho nerchantmen

pr~ctieally

on their

own.

In any war With t>he English, the Dutch rnereh:a.nts were bound
Bngl~nd

to suf.fer heu vily because

''ilas situated in such an

~dvan

tageous posl t:,ion as to be ui.ble to th:re;-i t~n the major Dutch ·trade

routes, while the English tr;lde I'outes ·were not as easily threatfue su<JCdss of tjhe Dutch policy of ott.Rcldne; the English

ened.

fleet rather ·than providine J.ar,::;e convoys for Dtttch merehRntment
'ir~s

evidenced in tha:c, i._i1ile the Dl1tch mety havo lost o.s many as

one thousand •?igh·t hundred sh:tps to

t:'H~

Enelish in the first w.tr 1

they lost only about five hundred :tn e.ach of the other two iwars.
Still, lo:sine "only" fiv(! hundred ships is

a nation's economy.

In

~pit1!

~ tr~mendous

blow to

of the English overseas trade

being much smaller than tha·t of the Dutch at this time, the
English 1nerchants keenly felt the loss o.f the .five hundred ships

that the Dutch were
67

~ble

to otipture or destroy throughout all

three ·wars.

·
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l~Iilson,

pp. 132 - 133.

Marcus, I, p. 165.
Davis, p. 51.
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The second Dutch i.iVar had proven to the E11glish that the

successes of the first war could not be improved upon or even
as easily repeated.

68

After the third Dutch w;.r, the

;.bout Dutch maritime superiority f:.liled to

re~ppe~r

~git~tion·

in

~ny

strength because the Entilieh had been shol>wn 1 through the use
of Dutch prizes, the Wa.y to cheaper shipment of goods and
shifted that

W*ly ·theruSt-'lv~s.

ual n:ivetl evolution

or

69

,,\bile

011

the one hand the grad-

the seventeenth century eventu.lly ex-

cluded armed roerchilntmen from navi'-'S so that if they ser\fed at
.
70
.Qll it was ~s provision ships, convoy escorts or fire shipe,
01i.

the other hand, the emergence of the English !b_vy from the

Dutch \\Jars as the most powerful navy aflorJ.t eliminated the need

for English merchant ships to be heavily an·Jed.
"The great hopes of t,hern of Holland is that this -warre will
not continue long, the leni.rch and continuance
t:ainly mine them

~nd

u11er~~of

nust cer-

tu.rnt? the trade in.to other channels, every

nation gettinr:; a share th(ereof. u

71

lh~re,

in a letter of April

28, 1665, from _Do"lming, the E:n:;lish ambas:!-ador in Holland, to
Lord Arlington, is see11 the

cont~mpon1ry

done to Dutch tra{:e by continued
significance of this leti;er is

\'f.f.rf~.re

th~. t

it

view c..f the hurt being
l'-li. th the English.

".~.s

written during the

second tutch war .. while most of the damage to

68

<Iilson, p. 155.

69

Davis. pp .. 53 - 54.

70

71

Barbour, p. 261.

Colenb:rander.-I, P• 167.

The

Holl~nd "11as

done

108
during the first and third Dutch i:ars.

suffered so heavily in the f'irs t

1~r

·rhe Dutch cmr.merce

a.nt! their highly

org~n-

izcd credit had been so strained thn.t they Wero p:;.ying a yearly
72

interest of five hundred 'thous&nd pounds on

w~.r

debts• ·

I'l.1e

1

second war hurt by increasing this dcbi.; 1 but the las"G war was
the crushing
w~rn

la.nd

s~rvecl

blo~'l

for the United Provinces.

fighting for her Vtry ex.i.stf.mce

:?... ncl co~nerci~l

tr~.d~

that the

~.nd

a superior

73

befor~

h~d

fa t'4.lly

cost the Hetherlcands her :maritime
The

tr~t.gedy

of the Dutch wars

tiaS

Holland made the cor:x..!on er·roi:-· of supposing

of either people could only prosper

of the:; other.
Just.

;1 nd

preen1inence.

both Snglaud

p~nse

GJ.g~inut

her independemce, hut this tremendous cffot•t

undermined her pros1)eri ty

th~ t

The fact that liol-

~l t

the ex-

74

the

Bt:~rt

lish are Q.bout to :-:"1.ttack

<.?.

of. the firBt /\.nglo-Dut:,ch w;1r, the

r:.::c·tmu;_in of golc; Ke

P.t't4ick ~- mount~in of iron. --:~75

~re ~.bout

to

His predict.ion !~cw~c true in that

the English benefited tremendously from the three greGI, t wars
botween

tTr!o

a.lmost -equa.lly r::a·cched

r1~1.val po:,,,rers, ? 6 On the one

hand the way was paved for English corrrrnercial

p. 84.
7723-~eiling,
)mreus,·It p. 173.

~;;~rbour, p.~290.

\dlson, p. 60.
76aardinGr tiind A-tkinson, ·vI, p. ll.

ex~.nsion

·while
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on the other hand, a global navy was born with the exista.nce of a pow·erful reserve kept in the Downs, a Medi ter•
ranean ·station, a moderately s·trons West Indian squadron
and the begj. nnings of a 1for1ih American station. 77

In the

fu'ta1re, this navy was to be an influ(mtial factor in con-

tinental politics.78

These were the benefits resulting

from attacking a mountain of gold; for at .Gacking a mountain of iron the Dutch lost heavily.

the Dutch lost the first war and won
were Pyhrric victor:tes.

While, technically,
th~

t•~

next two, they

While the Dutch checked the ag-

gressors, the tremendous cost in so doing, meant the
eventual loss

or

a large part of their world trade to the

English and decline from their position of power.

?~Oppenheim, pp. 302-JOJ.
-7 Ibid., p. 305.
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Appendix A

A Map ot the Main Battle Area

J
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Appendix B

A List of English Men-of•War
Below is a list of English ships with the number

or

men and the number of guns they carried, as of June, 1666:

Ship's N'ame
First Rate Ships ..
Royal Soveraigne

Prince Royal
Prince
Royal Charles
Royal James
London

Second Rate Ships •
Loyal London
Viotor1
Royall Oake
Royall Katherine
Henry·

Tryumph
Old James
Swift sure
St. George
St .. Andrew

Rupert

Defyance
Warspite
Unicorne
Vanguarde

Rainbow

Number of M!ffi

700
624'

700
650
;20

470

470

450
450
450
440
4.:30

380
380
360
360
320
320
320
320
320
.320

· Number .of Gilns

92
92

90
82
82

80

76

"76
76
76

72
72
70

66.

66
66

64

64
64
60
60

.56
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Third Rate Ships Fairefax
Mary
Henrietta
Anne
Yorke
Revenge

Cambridge
Montaigue
Dreadnaught
Plymouth
Monke
Dunkirke

300
300
280

60
60
58
58

300
320

58

JOO

2so

JOO
280
280

280
280

Resolution

300

Essex
House or Sweden
Clovetree
Helversone
Golden Phoenix
Monmouth
Leopard

260
280
250
260
260
320
2;0

Gloucester

2SO

;a

~a

5g

;s
58
58
58

;e

56

70

62

60

60
64

56

As one can see, there were no hard and fast rules for
determining whether a ship belonged to one rating or another.
In addition to the ships given above of the £irat 1 second and
third rating, there.were at this time:
62 fourth rate ships carrying between 34-52 guns,
27 fifth rate ships carrying between 20-36 guns,
27 sixth rate ships carrying between 6·14 guns,
6 hired merchant ships carrying between 36-70 gufs;
and 20 Dutch prizes carrying between .38•70 guns. · .

lcolenbrander, I, pp. 319-331.
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Appendix C

A List 0£ Dutch Men-of-War
Below is a list of Dutch ships· and the number of men
and guns they Qarried as 0£ May, 1665:
Ship ts

f~ame

Concord
Liefde
Mar seven
Orange
Court de Zelande
Grand Hollandia
Oosterwijck
Del£lant
.Sevenwolden
La Maison de Swieten
Oostergo
Hilversun
Passe-Temp
Cruyningen
Liberte
Couverden
Leopard
Ville et Villages .

Oelre
West.frise
Medenblick
Stoveren
Suyderhuys
La Paix
Gouda

Number of Men

soo

400
450
1+50
300
350

!~umber

84

82

400
.)00
300

78
75
78
70
70
70
70
70

290

62

325

325

260
250
250
240
250
2lt0

290

290
290

220

230
2.30
230

of Guns

62

62

62
60
60

60
60
60

60
59
.58

56

;6
56
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Le Paroq d 1 Hollande
Wester go

2$0

253
220

Cam pd en
Tromp

210

Maison d'Haerlem
Carolus V
Petite Hollandia
Jaersvelt
Provinces
Duyvenvoorde
Wakende Boey
Nagelbloom
La Bourse
Concorde
Joaua
Princess Albertina
Terveer
Rotterdam
Oostlandia

220
2.30

54
54

54

54
53:

204
220
220

.52
52

220

52

220

220

240
258
250

235

230

52
52

52
52

52
50

50

50

2JO

;o

250

50

z;;

Prince fl'iaurice

56

so

In addition to the above named ships, the Dutch also
had at this time 43 ships carrying between J0-48 guns and
9 ships carrying from 18.26 guns.l

laranville Penn, Memorials or·the Professional Life
and Times of Sir William Penn, Knt. (London, 1§33), VoI. II,
PP•

jI8-JI9.

'
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Appendix D

A Letter from Clifford to Lord Arlington
Below is printed the text of the letter referred to

in Chapter II, pages &2•74:
••• Upon Friday night the lst instant, we
had a fresh gale or wind all night and
next morning, by eight of the clock of·
which, we made both the fleets engaged,
and they had been so £rom three 0£ the
clock in the afternoon or the day befora,
for my Lord General going that day for
the Gun Fleet, his scouts brought him
notice of the Dutch fleet near him, and
so he made his engagement of them almost
necessary. By 11 of the clock Saturday,
we came close up to the engagement with
our little shallop of six guns, and my
Lord or Ossory would fain have had an
opportunity of giving the Dutch Admiral
a broadside in her. By two 0£ the clock,
in the heat or the fight, with much ado
we got into the R. Charles, where we found
things all well. and matters looked with a
good aspect on our side f'or two or three
hours, but then, after another pass, .five
0£ our better sort of ships or the second
and third rates were so shattered that they
ma.de ·- some with leave and others without leave - toward our own ports, which was a
great disheartening to the rest; especially
since so many good ships also had left the
fleet the day before, immediately after the
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first pass, without any notice ot their
condition given to my Lord General; of
which are the Henry, the Swiftsure, the
Rainbow, the Loyal Merchant, and I think,
the Portland. In fine, upon Saturday
night we round we could make but 34
fighting ships, and the Dutch hard enough
upon us; and then there was nothing to· be
heard among the common seamen but com•
plaints against dividing our fleet and
sending away Prince Rupert. This was a
strait, and my Lord General's conduct was
here well seen to be very good, for he
chose 1:>'u·~·:l6 of the greatest ships of
these 34, to be a bulwark to the rest,
and bring up the rear in a breast, and
so shoved on the other in a line before
him, and in this manner we maintained
an orderly and good retreat all Sunday,
the 3rd instant, till about three of the
clock that afternoon, when from topmast
head we made a fleet coming toward us,
which we supposed to be 1 as it was,· Prince
Rupert and his squadron. Within little
we made their,· flags and hulls, and then
in our whole fleet there was such shouting,
and the English haloo that the Dutchmen
that were all along firing at us were at·
a little pause, however kept on after us,
and we, endeavouring to join with Prince
Rupert, fell too near the shoal ground,
and first the Royal Oharles herself struck
upon the sands they call the Galloper, but
.came presently well off, so did also the
Royal Katherine; but the Royal Prince,
drawing more water than either stuck fast.
The Dutch with their small frigates immediately made towards. her, attlended with a
fireship or two, and we sent four or five
of our frigates to defend her, that drew
least water-, apd we ourselves would come
as near as we durst £or the sands; but to
the wonder of the whole·£leet, we saw the
flag and ancient struck, and she yielded
- when she had not herself' either shot ten
guns in her defence or received ten shot
from the enemy; 15 of their men came to us
in their boats, and they say they had four
fathom or water upon one side, and but two
on the other of their ship. When we had
joined with Prince Rupert, we hastened up
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where she lay, for though the Dutch had
possession'.0£ her, yet she still stuck
fast, and when they saw they could not
keep her, they set her on fire, the
sight of which was a sensible touch to
every man's heart in our fleet, es~
pecially since a little resistance would

have preserved her, and that she was so
able to stand it out. She was like a
castle in the sea. and I believe the
best ship that ever was built in the
world to endure battering, but she is
gone, and this is an ill subject to be
long upon.
This evening, the Jrd, we followed the
Dutch as close as we could and the night
would permit us. Monday morning, the 4th
instant . at sun rising we had sight or
them oniy at topmast head, to the windward
of us. We made what haste we could to
them, and they staid for us till we came
at a convenient distance, and then made
toward us. They, having the wind, kept
at a greater part from us than we would
have been willingly at, and therefore our braver commanders, impatient of it,
bore in upon them to go through and
through, or which were Sir Christopher

I•lings and Sir Robert Holmes in several

places, that had each many brave seconds,
and they had success enough, for by it
we divided their f'leet and did them rouoh·
mischief, though to eive them, the enemy,
also their due, they soon, upon many of
these passes that day, came together aeain
with great art and dexterity. We made
five passes this day, and not one 0£ them
ended but with a good appearance and as•
pect upon our side• in which we fired several
0£ their ships and they not one of ours, and
at the last of them, about five of the clock,
we divided their fleet, fell so after them
in the rear that in plain terms, those that
were to leeward or us in dividing of their
fleet, set all the sail they could and began
to run, and while we wera in chase of them and picking up some of their lame geese,
that part ot the .fleet that was to windward
of us tacks upon us; and being then divided,
part with the Prince and part with the Duke
or Albemarle, they gave th~ Duke 0£ Albemarle' a
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squadron no breath at all, but tack immediately again upon us. The Prince in
the Royal James had in the last pass lost
his mizen and main topmast, and his squadron was at such a distance that they could
not aome to our relief, being also so
shattered and maimed; and most of our own
frigates, to avoid the shook, runs to
leeward and shelter·themselvaa under the
Royal Charles. Scarce any but the Defiance
diverted the enemy from pouring their whole
broadside upon us; but we bore it well enough,
though at this time very much disabled in
our rigging and masts; which indeed was the
only aim of the Dutch, for the most part
placing their shot above our hulls. De
Ruyter soon observed the advantage he had
by our fleets being divided and both our
admirals disabled, that he makes aeiin a
sudden tack upon us. My Lord General, as
ill as his ship was, gives orders for
tacking likewise to preserve our lamed
frigates; but having received in the pass
before two.shots in his powder room, between
wind and.water, they could not be stopped
but by standing upon the same course; besides
our main topmast was so disabled by a shot
through him' that we were fain to lower our
main topsail, and our foremast had received
so many shots that it waa the general opinion there was danger or bringing her by the
board in tacking, and no signs for any of
the rest to tack would prevail anything
with them, so that we were forced to see
them fall upon our frigates in the rear,
without being able to rescue them; but we
saw also by this they could do us but little
harm; indeed none at all, if the Essex had
not most indiscreetly and unskilf'ully fallen
foul of a prize. a Dutch frigate that we had
just before taken, by which not only the
.
Ji;ssex but the said frigate tell again into
their hands.. ·The Convertine also, being
an old Dutch ship and a slow sailor, was
overtaken by two of their little frigates,
and without shooting a gun or ma.king any ·
resistance, she struck her ancient and
yielded. We might else have brought her
off with some of our frigates; but Captain
Pearce, the commander, was the more to be ·
blamed for tha.t he had scarce engaged the

whole day.. Our business was now to bear
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away before a wind to join with tho Prince's
squadron, and this cannot be called evon by
the Hollanders a running away, but the
proper course to join, which was the most
justifiable working, and when l~e were· joined,
the Dutch made no further after us. But by
this time it was sunset, and most of our
ships in an ill condition as I have told
your lordship our two admirals ware, other
wise we might have.steered to have met·with
them this morning again, ror by all that·
we can guess by the working of the enemy,
they were to be quit of us as we of them,
ror in that last pass before the division
of our fleet, at least ten of .their frigates
got homeward maimed, and perchance, if the
two generals had been in one ship, or if
either of the courses that either of them·
had taken had been jointly followed, viz.,
either to have pursued them in the rear ·
that we had severed to the leeward of us,
or to have tacked to have weathered their
whole fleet, perchance we had done their
work, and not have left it as it is now
for a drawn battle; for if the losses of
ea.ch side be considered, the enemy hath

little cause to boast, for besides that we

took, we burnt in t,he four days flight (sic.)

seven of their man-of-war, and all their
men are lost, which is a considerable one to
them. Wo have still in custody the captain
of the frigate we took. Now on the other
hand, our loss of the Princa Royal was great,
so was the Essex and the Convertine, and
their men too aro considerable; however,
they are not so bad as the men of· tho Dutch
ships, tor ours are but prisoners, and re•
deemable, and so our stock not diminished,
whereas theirs are blown up·or drowned;
and for our two other ships, viz., the
Black·Eagle and St. Paul, two old Dutch
ships, that were sunk and the other fired
by us when she was unserviceable by shots
and leaks, we sa_ved all the men of both,
and I do not yet hear of any other loss
we have, only there is discourse about the
fleet as if the Swiftsure were taken, but·
she hath not been seen in all their fleet,
but on the contrary Sir John Chicheley says
he saw.her go off clear, after the first
pass upon· Friday. We-have net no news,
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neither of those ships I mentioned in the
beginning, that went off with him; we do
yet also miss Sir Christopher r.:ings and
the Rupert, but have no reason to doubt
but that they are well, though not with
us.
The damage to the Hollands fleet must
needs be as much if not more than ours,
for there were left of them now, at last,
not above J.-0, and· they were in the beginning
S4 fighting ships. It must be confessed
many of ours got away after the first day,

for when Prince Rupert came to us, we ha:d

but 34 ships, and if the King do not catise
some of the capaains to be hanged, he will
never be wall f.1erved. '~Je hear of two good
ships that were coming out of the swing to
put to sea when they heard shooting again
they wont back; we have this relation from
a ketch. By·this backwardness in some 0£
his captains, the King still loses the
contest, for when they engage frankly and
a:r~ not seconded, the enemy hath advnntage
upon them, and often cuts them off t \'lhen

·the cowardly ones still remain to omit
their duties another time. If a severe
cm~se be not taken in this matter, this
5.s alone enough to ruin any great action
of our fleot.
This quitting 0£ the seas is more than
ever yet the Hollnnder could obtain, and
though it be for tho present somo honour
to them, and may, abroad, sorne~1at lessnn
our repu,rntion, yet that will signify but
lit1~le

to them o:r us 1 if amm.unition or

stores be suddenly provided, for this is
the chiefest matter that is wantj_ng, some
of the ships havine spent all to five or
six rounds or less; provisions also must
be thought upon, and then 5.f' Sir Jo. Mennes
bring rnoney enough to pay o£f tho arears,

the men will be in better heart than ever.
I hea:rd some of thorn mutter that they had
twenty months behind; these things will be
necessary to be hastened. It is also requisite that Sir William Coventry direct a new
press for seamen, and if these matters can
be dispatched, that our fleet may be upon
their coast before they are ready, the world
will then see who had the greatest loss,
and the Hollanders' brags, which undoubtedly

12,2

they ·will set forth to the world in a h1gh
measure, will vanish and turn to their disadvantage.
I am not yet certain of the ntunber 0£
our slain and wounded, hut by my atr~cteat
inquiry and by conferring with my Lord
General, we conclude that there canno~ be
less than 1500 wounded and tWO slain 6n
1

•

our part; we have not lost many commanders

beside Capt •. Terne, Capt. Bacon,· and the
captains of the Uni<rorn, the 'l'riumph and
the St. George ••••

lareen, Sta;te Pa;eers, 1665-16,6§., pp. :x:ix-xxiv.
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